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Abstract 
 
Email has become a common mode of communication for confidential personal as well as 
business needs. There are different approaches to authenticate the sender of an email message at 
the receiver‟s client and ensure that the message can be read only by the intended recipient. A 
typical approach is to use an email encryption standard to encrypt the message on the sender‟s 
client and decrypt it on the receiver‟s client for secure communication.  A major drawback of 
this approach is that only the encrypted email messages are stored in the mail servers and the 
default search does not work on encrypted data. This project details an approach that could be 
adopted for securely searching email messages protected using end-to-end encrypted email 
communication.  
This project proposes an overall design for securely searching encrypted email messages and 
provides an implementation in Java based on a cryptographically secure Bloom filter technique 
to create a secure index. The implemented library is then integrated with an open source email 
client to depict its usability in a live environment. The technique and the implemented library are 
further evaluated for security and scalability while allowing remote storage of the created secure 
index. The research in this project would enhance email clients that support encrypted email 
transfer with a full secure search functionality. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Overview 
Email (Electronic mail) has become a common mode of communication for confidential personal 
as well as business needs. Email messages are composed and sent using a local email client 
which could be a browser based thin client software like Gmail web interface [Google 2015] or 
thick clients like Thunderbird [Mozilla 2015] or Outlook [Microsoft 2015]. The composed email 
messages are sent to the mail servers which facilitate the transfer of messages to the 
corresponding recipients. The messages are typically encrypted to and from mail servers using a 
transport layer security protocol (TLS) [Dierks & Rescorla 2008]. But the mail server has access 
to the un-encrypted plain text form of the message contents.  
Even though mail service providers may protect their data servers, recent leaks [Guardian News 
and Media Limited 2015] regarding the surveillance of data servers by government agencies and 
the number of possible attacks [Nanavati et al. 2014] on the data handled by the servers 
emphasises a lack of security and privacy of the user‟s data stored on an un-trusted cloud storage. 
This has motivated the use of encrypted email services, in particular when communicating 
confidential information.  
A common approach for sending an encrypted message through email is to send encrypted 
attachments [Adobe Systems Incorporated. 2015; WinZip Computing 2013] as a password 
protected ZIP or PDF files. This method is commonly used in sending e-financial statements by 
banks or income tax statements by tax departments. This technique is used due to a lack of 
sophisticated support for sending encrypted email message, instead of an encrypted attachment. 
And it provides a reasonable guarantee that only the intended recipient could view the 
attachment.  
There are many encryption protocols that specify a mechanism to send and receive encrypted 
emails, the most commonly used encryption protocols include OpenPGP [Torto et al. 2015] and 
S/MIME [Ramsdell & Turner 2010]. Some mail servers [Hush Communications Canada Inc. 
2015; Trancecrypt Inc. 2014] that support secure mail transfer have the encryptions performed at 
the mail server, so the mail server and the storage needs to be completely trusted. A security that 
the data could be read only by the intended recipient at the receiver side is possible only with the 
help of end-to-end encrypted email transfer. 
End-to-End encryption requires keys used to encrypt the messages be managed at the client sides 
i.e., sender and the receiver. Sender encrypts the message using a public key and this encrypted 
message could be decrypted only by the receiver‟s private key. With end-to-end encryption, only 
the encrypted messages can be seen by the mail servers and thus the default search service 
provided by the mail servers is not usable. 
1.2 Motivation 
Mailvelope [Oberndörfer 2014], GPGTools [GPGTools 2015] and Enigmail [Brunschwig 2015] 
are some of the tools that offers functionalities for sending and receiving end-to-end encrypted 
email messages. Most of the tools are plug-ins or extensions to existing email clients. Moreover, 
ProtonMail [Yen et al. 2015], a mail service provider, offers mail services promising a full 
pledged end-to-end encrypted service. But the common problem with these tools is that once the 
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data is encrypted, the encrypted email messages are stored in the mail provider storage and the 
default search for email does not work on these encrypted messages. This project would enable 
end-to-end encrypted email service providers to implement a full-pledged service with a secure 
search capability. 
Searching on encrypted data is discussed in some cryptography papers including [Xiaodong et al. 
2000; Shmueli et al. n.d.; Goh 2004; Thian et al. 2005] . But the feasibility of an implementation 
of the techniques proposed by these research papers using the existing encryption libraries as 
well as the suitability of the technique with email communication is not clear. This project aims 
to identify an approach for which an implementation is possible with the existing cryptographic 
libraries. Furthermore, development of a tool using the approach would provide evidence of its 
suitability for searching encrypted email messages. 
A naive approach would be to decrypt all the encrypted messages and store them in a local 
storage to support searching. But storing the decrypted data is inefficient with respect to storage 
and portability, as a copy of the email is accessible only on the machine where decrypted emails 
are stored. In addition, it increases the security risk if the storage is compromised. This project 
aims to store a secure index of the encrypted emails, promising security and space efficiency. 
Moreover this project evaluates the feasibility of storing the index on a remote server which 
supports network search from any machine. 
1.3 Objectives 
The main goal of the project is to identify a mechanism to search encrypted email messages that 
complements an end-to-end encrypted email transfer between a sender and receiver. And this 
project focuses on the commonly used protocols for email encryption: OpenPGP and S/MIME. 
The security and feasibility of such an approach should be evaluated with the help of a tool that 
supports searching. Moreover, the scalability and usability of the tool needs to be evaluated. 
1.3.1 Primary objectives 
 Identify an approach for securely searching encrypted email messages. 
 Develop a tool that supports creating a secure index of the email messages encrypted 
using the OpenPGP encryption protocol. 
 Add a search capability to the tool resulting in pointers to the indexed email messages. 
1.3.2 Secondary objectives 
 Enhance the tool to support indexing of email messages encrypted using S/MIME 
protocol. 
 Extend the tool to support incremental indexing for incorporating new email messages. 
1.3.3 Tertiary objectives 
 Integrate the library with an open source Java email client to demonstrate the functionality 
in a live environment. 
1.4 Project outcome 
The project‟s outcomes are a Java library that could be integrated into an existing email client for 
securely searching email and an email client with a beta support reflecting usability and security. 
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Moreover, it proposes architecture for adding secure search functionality in the current email 
communication model. 
The implementation satisfies the primary and secondary objectives with capabilities to index and 
search encrypted email messages using S/MIME and OpenPGP protocols. The implementation 
makes use of the existing Bouncy Castle [Bouncy Castle Inc 2013] cryptographic libraries and 
adopts a layered design supporting future extensions. This project recommends an integration 
model for securely searching email using the implemented library and analyses alternative 
designs for security. Finally the security and scalability of the technique and implementation is 
evaluated. 
1.5 Dissertation Organisation 
This dissertation document organisation is outlined as follows. 
Context Survey section provides a background of end-to-end email encryption standards and 
describes the related tools and techniques that influence this project. 
Strategy section presents the design, development and evaluation strategies adopted for this 
project. 
Design section provides an overview of high level design of the overall solution. It is followed 
by different architectural views of the implemented library and the proposed integration design 
of the library with the existing email clients. 
Implementation section details the implementation strategy, key decisions made and challenges 
encountered during the implementation of the library. 
Secure Searcher section provides an overview of the functionality provided by the implemented 
library. 
Evaluation section provides a critical analysis of the technique and implementation with respect 
to the security, adopted strategy and scalability. 
Conclusions and Future Work section summarises the achieved goals, encountered challenges 
and possible future works on the project. 
This document concludes with a series of appendices describing A Testing Summary, B Changes 
to Original Specification, C Project Plan and D User Manual.  
. 
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2 Context Survey 
This chapter includes the details and influence of the related works that were considered for the 
development of the tool. This chapter begins with a background section including an overview of 
existing end-to-end encryption techniques followed by the related works section providing an 
overview of end-to-end encryption tools, indexing and search techniques. 
2.1 Background 
This section outlines the background of basic encryption and end-to-end encryption techniques. 
2.1.1 Encryption basic techniques 
There are two classes of basic encryption techniques. One is referred to as symmetric encryption 
where the data is encrypted using a shared secret key or password phrase and the data could be 
decrypted only using the same secret key used for encryption. Another class of encryption refers 
to the public key encryption, where two keys (private and public key) are maintained. The 
private key is confidential and known only to the owner where as the public key could be 
announced liberally. The messages encrypted using one key could be decrypted only by another 
key of the key pair respectively. 
2.1.2 End-to-End Encryption Techniques 
The end-to-end encryption refers to a class of techniques where the encryption and decryption 
are performed at the end user clients without involvement of a centralised encryption server. The 
techniques that are considered popular and widely used/implemented for email communication 
[Internet Mail Consortium 2015] are listed as follows. 
2.1.2.1 PGP 
PGP (Pretty Good Privacy) [Atkins et al. 1996] refers to a class of systems developed to support 
encrypted email communications using a combination of symmetric encryption and public key 
encryption technique. It was created by Philip Zimmermann in 1991 and the subsequent versions 
were released with his guidance and are owned by PGP Corporation. The major services offered 
by PGP includes the following 
 Digital signature service offered by PGP involves sender creating a hash code of the 
email message and encrypting it with the private key. The receiver could decrypt the hash 
code with the corresponding public key and compare it with the hash code of the received 
message for authenticity. The signatures are normally attached to the message although it 
could also be sent as a separate entity after the message. 
 Confidentiality of the email message is supported by the public key encryption. Sender 
generates a random key called session key and encrypts the message using that session 
key. The session key is then encrypted with the receiver‟s public key. The encrypted 
session key and the message are sent to the receiver, where the session key is decrypted 
using the receiver‟s private key. The decrypted session key is then used to decrypt the 
message. If the message includes a signature, both the signature and message are 
encrypted using the session key at the sender‟s side. 
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2.1.2.2 OpenPGP/MIME 
OpenPGP [Callas et al. 2007] refers to a standard for open source security implementation based 
on PGP standard 5.x. The initial standard for Internet text messages [Crocker 1982] supported 
only the transfer of text messages through email. Other formats like images or audio needed to 
be transformed to reversible textual byte code for transmission using the initial standard. MIME 
(Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions) [Freed & Borenstein 1996] specifies a mechanism to 
transmit data including text, images and audio files. Email messages with MIME headers could 
be broken down into multiple parts each having its own content type such as text, html and 
image. 
Initially PGP was integrated with MIME using a special content type „application/pgp‟ where the 
signed messages are included into the body part. But the email clients were not able to decode 
the messages without separating a specific PGP implementation details as part of the signature. 
OpenPGP/MIME [Torto et al. 2015] specifies a mechanism to separate signature and the 
message body so as to send encrypted messages using MIME. OpenPGP/MIME mechanism 
includes the introduction of following content types 
 The content type “application/pgp-signature” is used to denote signature part of the 
message‟s multi-parts. 
 The encrypted message is included as a two-part multipart with content type 
"multipart/encrypted" and protocol parameter value "application/pgp-encrypted". The 
first part contains the version number while the second part contains the actual encrypted 
data. 
 The content type “application/pgp-keys” is used to transmit public keys as part of the 
email message. 
2.1.2.3 S/MIME 
S/MIME (Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions) [Ramsdell & Turner 2010] specifies a 
mechanism to transfer secure MIME data using HTTP in addition to other supported protocols. 
S/MIME introduces a content type “application/pkcs7-mime” to specify the secured MIME parts. 
The messages are secured using Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) based on PKCS7 (Public 
Key Cryptography Standard 7) [Kaliski 1998]. 
The user needs a key (private key) and certificate pair to use S/MIME mechanism. The 
certificate contains the public key information with a signature using private key. The certificate 
is entitled to an individual and should be obtained from a certificate authority (CA). The free 
certificates can be obtained from online security entities such as StartSSL [StarCom Ltd. 2011] 
and Comodo [Comodo CA Limited 2015]. The sender signs the message using the private key 
and encryption is performed using the receiver‟s certificate. The receiver could authenticate the 
origin signature using the sender‟s public certificate and the message could be decrypted using 
the receiver‟s private key. 
2.2 Related Work  
This section includes the existing end-to-end encryption tools and the encryption search 
techniques that were researched during development. 
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2.2.1 End-to-End Email Encryption Tools 
The following end-to-end email encryption tools were investigated during the development of 
the library. 
2.2.1.1 Mutt 
Mutt [Elkins & Blosser 2014] is a Linux based email client that uses GPG to provide support for 
OpenPGP/MIME email communication. GPG (GNU Privacy Guard) [Koch et al. 2015] is a free 
implementation of the OpenPGP standard and is developed as part of the GNU project [Free 
Software Foundation 2015]. Moreover, Mutt includes a support for S/MIME encrypted emails as 
well. 
Mutt provides support for searching encrypted email messages [Gilles 2012], by decrypting each 
email and searching in the decrypted content. In addition to being highly inefficient when 
searching email, the Mutt tool works only on Linux environment. Notmuch [Notmuch 2014] is a 
Linux based mail indexing and searching tool that could be integrated with Mutt. Whenever a 
search is made, the results are stored and indexed in a special directory to support future search 
rendering the messages vulnerable to attack if the indexed directory is compromised. This project 
identifies an approach to build a secure index that supports efficient search using a platform 
independent Java library. 
2.2.1.2 ProtonMail 
ProtonMail Beta [Yen et al. 2015] provides a web based mail service like Gmail except with the 
support for end-to-end encryption ensuring privacy. ProtonMail servers are deployed at 
Switzerland thereby protected by strict Swiss based laws for data privacy.  
ProtonMail uses OpenPGP standard and open source cryptographic libraries for encrypted email 
communication, where all the encryptions and decryptions take place at the end user system. The 
private and public keys are generated in the client‟s system when a new user signs up for a 
ProtonMail account. All public keys are stored directly in the server whereas the private keys are 
encrypted using the user‟s password on the client‟s system and the encrypted private key is 
stored on the server. 
In addition to OpenPGP communication, users can send regular un-encrypted email or email 
encrypted using symmetric encryption to other users without encryption support. In the later 
case, the receiver would receive a link and upon entering the shared password (symmetric key) 
the message is decrypted. ProtonMail is still in beta stage, and is not clear if there is search 
support for the encrypted email messages.   
2.2.1.3 Mailpile 
Mailpile [Einarsson et al. 2015] is an open source software written in Python that could be 
installed on the user system. It provides a web interface on top of existing mail servers and it 
enhances the services with the functionality to send and receive OpenPGP encrypted messages. 
The encrypted messages are automatically decrypted for viewing as shown in the next figure. 
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Figure 2-1 OpenPGP decrypted message using MailPile 
Mailpile is still in beta stage, where the connection to Gmail server was intermittent during the 
analysis of the tool as part of this project. Moreover, it is not clear how the key management is 
supported by the tool. Interestingly, Mailpile supports searching of the OpenPGP encrypted 
messages. As an answer to one of the FAQs (Frequently Asked Questions), Mailpile‟s reply 
regarding the security of the search support is “The search index is stored encrypted, and the 
terms are stored as hashes. Good enough?” The figure below shows the search results including 
the encrypted email (one with green lock icon) for search word „email‟. 
 
Figure 2-2 Mailpile search on encrypted email 
The encryption algorithms used and data structures used to store index or the technique to 
ascertain the security of search is not documented and one with Python expertise could review 
these aspects as part of the source code. If the created index is an inverted index with index 
pointer and search terms encrypted, then it is vulnerable to frequency analysis attack where 
depending on number of indexes (messages) a hashed search term occurs, the attacker could 
identify the hashed search term. This project identifies an approach that is analysed for security 
attacks including frequency analysis attack and moreover the performance of the search 
operation is evaluated. 
15 
 
2.2.1.4 Mailvelope 
Mailvelope [Oberndörfer 2014] is an extension plug-in for browsers based on OpenPGP.js java 
script library to support OpenPGP encrypted email communication. The plug-in interface is 
woven into the existing web interface provided by the popular web email providers such as 
Yahoo, Gmail and GMX. In addition, Mailvelope provides support for key management where a 
user could generate, import or export keys for OpenPGP encryption. 
 
Figure 2-3 Mailvelope mail compose editor with Gmail 
The figure above shows the compose editor provided by Mailvelope and is weaved together with 
the Gmail composer. After encryption, the message could be transferred to the Gmail editor and 
sent to the intended recipients. The figure below shows the corresponding encrypted message 
which is shown with a lock sign and decrypted with a click if the receiver has the private key 
with Mailvelope installed. Since the email messages are encrypted, the default Gmail search 
would not work on them and Mailvelope has no support to search such encrypted messages as 
well. 
 
Figure 2-4 OpenPGP encrypted message using Mailvelope 
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2.2.1.5 Thunderbird 
Thunderbird email client [Mozilla 2015] provides support for S/MIME encrypted email 
communication. Moreover, it includes a Certificate Manager to store sender‟s certificate and 
import other people‟s public certificate. This is depicted in the People tab of the figure below 
with an imported public certificate of mbmbalmani@gmail.com. Similar support is provided by 
outlook email client [Microsoft 2015] as well. 
 
Figure 2-5 Thunderbird S/MIME Encryption with Certificate Manager 
An enhancement [Chang 2005] to support search on the encrypted messages communicated 
using Thunderbird was filed initially on 2005. The enhancement initially suggests storing the 
decrypted messages in local folder for search capability and link both encrypted and decrypted 
messages. Owing to the open source nature of Thunderbird implementation and extensions made 
in S/MIME standard during the ten year span, the original enhancement still remains in the NEW 
status and is yet to be implemented. This project identifies an approach to store only the secure 
index for searching instead of storing decrypted form of all messages. Moreover, the secure 
index could be stored in a remote un-trusted storage and shared with other local machines. 
2.2.1.6 Enigmail 
Enigmail [Brunschwig 2015] is an extension to Thunderbird to support OpenPGP secure email 
communications. As shown in the next figure, Enigmail has a key management facility to 
generate and import keys. 
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Figure 2-6 Encryption using Enigmail with Key Management 
The encrypted messages are automatically decrypted on view with Thunderbird, provided the 
corresponding private key is available in the key store. For the first time, Thunderbird prompts 
for the password of the private key as shown in the figure below. The private key is then stored 
in cache for limited time during which other encrypted messages are automatically decrypted on 
view. 
 
Figure 2-7 OpenPGP decryption using Enigmail 
2.2.2 Search Techniques on Encrypted data 
Storing data in the encrypted form requires trade off in terms of other functionalities such as 
searching data which becomes computationally or spatially inefficient. The following encrypted 
search techniques are analysed for its applicability as part of the end-to-end email encryption. 
The following sections outline the overview of each technique and analyses the applicability as 
part of the project. 
2.2.2.1 Forward Index 
Informally, Forward index refers to the indexing technique for documents where each 
document‟s unique id points to a set of words contained in that document. Hence the search for a 
word using forward index would require sequentially scanning each document and comparing 
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against all unique words in each document. If N is the number of documents and M is the 
average number of unique words in a document then O(N.M) comparisons would be required.   
2.2.2.1.1 Applicability 
Forward index technique is inefficient in terms of space required to store the data and number of 
computations required to search. It imitates how the documents are normally stored and is not 
typically used for searching. This project uses a cryptographically secure technique similar to the 
forward index approach to create a secure index where the encrypted document id points to a 
secure Bloom filter representing hashed set of words, instead of storing the words themselves. 
2.2.2.2 Homomorphic Encryption 
Homomorphic encryption refers to a class of encryption techniques that allows a range of 
computations to be performed on the encrypted data without decryption.  This project is 
interested in a homomorphic encryption technique that enables secure and efficient searching on 
the encrypted data. Searchable homomorphic encryption technique is diagonally opposite to the 
naive approach of decrypting all the data and searching over it. 
Xiaodong et al. [2000] discusses an approach where each word (Wi) is XORed (Exclusive Or) 
with a pseudo random bits (Ti) generated using Wi and the location i. The XORed values (ciphers 
Ci) are stored in the database. To search for a word (Ws), Ws and pseudo random bits for that 
word (Ts) are input to the searcher which compares Ts with XOR of each cipher word (Ci) and 
Ws. This technique allows searching for a word as well as recovering the document (decrypting 
all words) if needed. 
2.2.2.2.1 Applicability 
There are number of similar search techniques [Thian et al. 2005; Chang & Mitzenmacher 2005], 
which require storing the data in a new searchable encryption form. Homomorphic encryption 
techniques are a current area of research in many industries especially the cloud service 
providers. But this project identifies a searching technique that is built on top of currently used 
encryption protocols for email communications such as OpenPGP and S/MIME. Moreover, the 
indexing techniques are analysed for applicability, where it is not necessary to recover the words 
from index. 
2.2.2.3 Inverted Index  
A typical indexing technique is an inverted index tree, where each word (W) points to a set of 
document pointers (document‟s unique id) whose documents contain the word (W). Hence the 
search for a word using inverted index would require scanning of all the unique words across all 
documents. This approach is space efficient by storing only the unique words across all 
documents and is typically stored in a tree structure requiring O(log N) comparisons where N is 
the number of unique words across all documents. 
Xiaodong et al. [2000] discusses a possible way to securely store and search the inverted index. 
This would involve encrypting the words and document pointers associated with each word. This 
is vulnerable to frequency analysis attack as it allows easy analysis of number of occurrences of 
a word. To tackle against the frequency analysis attack, the document pointer list could be 
maintained with identical size for all the words. This is possible by including additional dummy 
document pointers to the documenter pointer list of the words with fewer occurrences.  
19 
 
2.2.2.3.1 Applicability 
This project agrees with Xiaodong et al. [2000] that it would be a good research area to identify 
how an addition of a new document could be securely handled. If a new document (D) is added 
and the document pointer list of an existing word (W) in the inverted index is not updated, then it 
implies that the word (W) is not contained in the document (D).  
This project visualises one possible way to securely store an inverted index of N documents is to 
have each word  in the index point to a document pointer list with size N, indicating the presence 
of the word in all the documents. Hence an addition of a new document would require adding 
one entry or updating the document pointer list of all words in the index tree. Even then, if there 
is a new word (WN) in the added document (D), then the index would need to add the word (WN) 
with document pointer list thus leaking the information a new word (WN) is not contained in all 
the previous documents, but only in the new document (D). Thus creating a secure index using 
this technique would require all words stored in the index initially which is inefficient and 
impractical. 
2.2.2.4 Secure Index based on Bloom Filter 
Bloom filter [Bloom 1970] represents an array of bits of length M used to store a set elements N. 
Each element Ni is represented using r set bits in the Bloom filter. The mapping of an element to 
the Bloom filter is performed with the help of r hash functions (h1, h2 ... hr) each of which maps 
an element to an index 1 to M of the Bloom filter. 
To search for an element Es in the Bloom filter, r hash functions are applied on the element Es 
and the r set bits in the Bloom filter at the indices resulted from r hash functions indicate Es may 
be present in the set. As with any hashed mapping, there is a possibility of overlapping and a 
probability for false positive i.e., the search for an element En which is not in the original set 
could be perceived as present as the bits for the En could have been set by the other elements. But 
if any of the r bits is not set in the Bloom filter then Es is definitely not present in the set. 
Eu-Jin Goh [2004] proposes an approach to build a secure index using Bloom filter. This 
involves maintaining a Bloom filter for each document. To index a document, all the words from 
that document are extracted and hashed using a key. Each hashed word is then used as a key to 
hash that document‟s unique id, so that the presence of a same word in multiple documents is not 
leaked into the corresponding Bloom filter. That is if a same word is present in multiple 
documents, different r bits will be set in those document‟s Bloom filter owing to their unique 
document id. Then the r hash functions are applied on the final hashed word to populate the 
Bloom filter. 
To search for a word in the index, the search word is first hashed using the same key used for 
indexing. This hashed word is called trap door as only an authorised person with access to the 
key could generate the trap door and proceed further for search. For each document, the trap door 
is used as a key to hash the document id and then the final hashed word is searched for its 
occurrence in the corresponding Bloom filter with the help of r hash functions.  
2.2.2.4.1 Applicability 
Goh‟s Bloom filter technique is secure with maintaining an index for each document. It is faster 
requiring O(N) to search for a word in N documents. The Bloom filter does not enable retrieval 
of the indexed words which is not necessary for indexing email messages as part of this project. 
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The implementation of Bloom filter is space efficient with a BitSet data structure where each bit 
could represent a presence of an entry (word) in the set (document). 
The major drawback with the Bloom filter technique is the false positive rate associated with the 
technique. The false positive rate can be controlled, in order to decrease the false positive 
percentage, the number of bits M or the size of the Bloom filter needs to be increased which 
tradeoffs with the space efficiency. The false positive association with email search is acceptable 
from the view of this project as a user could always view the message and ignore the result. This 
project aims to set the false positive rate configurable, so that the indexing is usable for all users 
with different space constraints. 
2.2.2.5 Hybrid scheme for search 
This technique [Thian et al. 2005] is a hybrid of Bloom filter [Goh 2004], encrypted sequential 
scan and encrypted inverted index techniques [Xiaodong et al. 2000] that are discussed in the 
previous sections. Hybrid scheme aims to combine the good properties of the previous 
techniques such as easy integration with the support for indexing any data of the Bloom filter 
technique and preserving the stored words for decryption of Xiaodong et al. [2000]. 
The scheme involves maintaining a hash table as an index per document similar to the Bloom 
filter model. At first words from the document are extracted and encrypted. Then hash of each 
encrypted word and the document id of D is used as the key to D‟s hash table. The encrypted 
word XORed with pseudo random bits as in the technique described by Xiaodong et al. [2000] is 
used as the corresponding value in the hash table. The search for the word (Ws) is possible by 
encrypting the search word and then hashing with the document id to check for the Ws 
occurrence in that document‟s hash table. 
Hence this scheme uses hash table technique from Bloom filter for indexing each document 
along with encryption and decryption technique form Xiaodong et al. [2000] for preserving the 
indexed words for decryption. 
2.2.2.5.1 Applicability 
Thian et al. [2005] performs a comparison of this hybrid scheme with the parent techniques. 
Hybrid scheme has an average processing run time compared with other techniques as the Bloom 
filter and inverted index techniques are much faster than the hybrid scheme. This project 
perceives the encryption and decryption of each word would increase the indexing and searching 
time considerably. This technique would be a good alternative if it is necessary to retrieve the 
indexed words from the index storage. 
2.2.3 Email Client Integration 
The library that is developed as part of the implementation needs to be integrated with existing 
email clients to depict the suitability for practical use. The following sections briefly summarises 
the class of email clients and the possible integration approaches that were considered for the 
integration of the developed library. 
2.2.3.1 Thin Email Clients – Web Browser 
The web interface in the browsers connected to email server acts as a thin email client for 
accessing email messages. The implemented library should complement the existing browser 
plug-in tools that support end-to-end encryption. The integration is possible with a separate 
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trusted index server that uses the exposed searching and indexing APIs (Application 
Programming Interfaces).  
For indexing, this project foresee the following two alternatives 
 End-to-end encryption plug-in tools for browsers could be extended to connect to the 
index server and then send the decrypted message contents for indexing whenever the 
plug-in tool is invoked to view/decrypt the encrypted message. The key management is 
handled as part of the end-to-end encryption plug-in tools. 
 The index server periodically queries the mail server for new messages and indexes them. 
In this case, the index server should handle key management. 
For searching, the index server needs to be queried for the result message ids and the mail server 
needs to be invoked to display the search results (messages). This could be part of the existing 
end-to-end encryption plug-in tool or a separate extension if the latter option is used for the 
indexing process. 
Consequently this approach requires an additional user authentication by the implemented library 
for connecting to the mail server either as part of the browser plug-in tool extension or from the 
index server.  
2.2.3.2 Thick email clients - Thunderbird 
Enhancement [Chang 2005] to support search for the encrypted email communication is still in 
NEW Status. This project perceives the discussions in that enhancement and yet to be solved 
enhancement as a proof for non-trivial nature of implementing such a facility as part of the core 
thunderbird client. 
Therefore this project examined the feasibility of developing a separate plug-in to support 
encrypted email searching. Such a plug-in development is possible using Javascript and there is 
support for C++ or Python language implementations as well. But, the extension development 
documents specify plug-in development mechanism using Javascript [Mozilla Developer 
Network 2015b; MozillaZine 2013] extensively as it is applicable to both Firefox web browser 
and Thunderbird email client belonging to the same Mozilla group employing many common 
technologies. While it is possible to invoke Java APIs as part of the Javascript plug-in code or 
convert the Java implementation to Javascript [Mozilla Developer Network 2015a], there is no 
direct support for invoking a Java library. 
2.2.3.3 Open Source Java email Clients 
There are number of open source email clients implemented in Java [Java-Source 2015] 
primarily using Javamail [Oracle 2013b], an external library for sending and receiving messages 
with a connection to external mail server.  This project initially explored for a Java client that has 
built-in support for S/MIME and OpenPGP encrypted email communication.  
Pooka [Pilone et al. 2001] specification indicates that it has support for PGP and S/MIME 
encryption. The client has only alpha support for decryption and its key management is not fully 
documented. This project tried to configure the encryption setup but the keys could not be 
imported to the client. Hence this project could not examine the support provided by Pooka for 
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PGP and S/MIME. Pooka has a normal search support which could be extended with the 
implemented library. 
 
Figure 2-8 Pooka Email Client 
Columba [Dietz et al. 2013] is another open source email client in Java with an user friendly 
interface. Though it has no built-in support for S/MIME or PGP encryption, the plug-in 
architecture of the client enables easy integration of new features. Despite the fact that the open 
source Java clients are slow owing to the Java swing UI, this project aims to identify the 
integration points that help with integration of the implemented library with any email client. 
 
Figure 2-9 Columba Email Client 
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3 Strategy 
The project‟s goal is to identify a technique that supports securely searching encrypted email 
stored on un-trusted storage. This involves researching the existing cryptography techniques and 
deciding an approach suitable for email messages. The chosen approach needs to be 
implemented and integrated with an email client to depict the suitability of that approach in 
practice. 
The following sections describe the development and testing strategies employed for this project. 
3.1 Development strategy 
This section outlines the strategies employed for the selection of technique and the 
corresponding implementation. As described in the following sections, the selection and choice 
adopted for one influence the other. 
3.1.1 Technique selection 
The following strategies were adopted in the selection of cryptography technique and they are 
listed in the order of importance with higher order first. 
 The primary factor influencing the selection is the feasibility of implementation of the 
technique using the libraries that are currently available. 
 The technique should support securely storing the index data an un-trusted storage.  The 
index data should not reveal any detail that is not deducible by an attacker with access to 
the corresponding encrypted email. 
 This project deals with the end-to-end encrypted email communication with the 
encrypted email messages already being stored in the mail server; hence the index data 
may not be a replication of the already stored encrypted data. This imply that data stored 
as part of the index may need to be lesser than the original encrypted email message.  
 It may not be possible to assess the run time requirements based on the technique 
description, as the library used affects the run time for the cryptographic operations. The 
following two things may be assessed 
 A typical unsecure index requires only one communication with index where a 
search query is sent and the results are retrieved. The upper bound of the number 
of communication needed for storing or securely searching index may be linear in 
terms of number of messages or search results. 
 The number of comparison needed for searching should not exceed the naive 
comparison limit i.e., the number of comparisons where each word in the 
encrypted data is matched against the search word.  
3.1.2 Implementation strategy 
The following lists outline the strategy adopted for the implementation. 
 This project follows an incremental prototype based approach where an initial prototype 
is developed which is extended to the final implementation. 
 The cryptography library chosen should be stable with some evidence of its usage in 
successful projects. Moreover, the support for issues should readily exist with some 
answered questions.  
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 This project may choose offline mail storage for its initial development and further 
evaluation but there should be some evidence of its usability in a live environment. 
 Any research project has its uncertainty with the implementation time line; this project 
may stick with the original plan being broken down to individual tasks after consultation 
with the supervisor. And there may not be a blocker issue more than a week without 
seeking advice from supervisor. 
3.2 Testing strategy 
This project employs JUnit testing, scenario based testing and scalability tests as the techniques 
for evaluating the project. 
3.2.1 JUnit and Scenario based testing 
JUnit tests shall be used for testing each functional module in the implementation. The 
effectiveness of such tests shall be measured through a code coverage tool and shall have at least 
80 percent code coverage. The tests shall be part of the same project as the source code or a 
different test project with dependencies on the source project. 
This project shall employ manual scenario based testing for testing end functionality which 
cannot be tested through unit tests. These tests would involve manual execution of operations in 
a live environment requiring human interpretation. 
3.2.2 Performance 
The performance of the implementation shall be tested on a corpus of encrypted email messages. 
The performance shall be measured in terms of time required for indexing and searching as well 
as space required for storing indexed messages. The measured time and space shall be plotted 
against the number of messages and length of the messages. This evaluation should aim to 
identify an upper bound against number and length of messages and identify areas of 
performance improvement or bottlenecks in the implementation. 
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4 Design 
This chapter describes the overall design proposed by this project for securely searching 
encrypted email followed by the logical design and design decisions made for the 
implementation of different functionalities. This chapter concludes with the runtime and 
deployment view of the implemented library. 
4.1 Solution Design 
This section describes the overall design for securely searching encrypted email and its pre-
requisite is an end-to-end encrypted email communication setup. Therefore the existing setup 
should enable sending and receiving encrypted email messages and the implementation of this 
project complements the existing setup with secure search functionality.  
Initially this section describes the core technique employed in the design followed by the 
notation used to represent the design diagrams. And then the logical and deployment views 
proposed by this project are outlined. All the design views presume that there exists an end-to-
end encrypted email communication setup between User1 and User2 and the views from the 
perspective of User1 with the secure searcher functionality are described. 
4.1.1 Core Technique 
This project uses Goh‟s Bloom filter [Goh 2004] as a core technique for creating a secure index 
given an email message (document) and unique message Id (document Id). This project suggests 
extensions to Goh‟s approach and recommends a practical design for securely searching 
encrypted email messages. The design proposed by this project includes the overall solution 
design, design of the implemented library and the integration design describing how the 
implementation could be integrated to an existing email client. 
4.1.1.1 Modification to the Technique 
During the indexing process, each word in the document is hashed using a key and this hashed 
word is referred as a trap door for that word. The trap door is again used as a key to hash the 
document id and then the final hashed word is converted into a set of r indices and corresponding 
bits are set in the Bloom filter. Finally, instead of storing the Bloom filter and document id as an 
index, as proposed by the original technique, this project stores the Bloom filter and encrypted 
document id as an index. 
During the search process, for the searched word the corresponding trap door word is created.  
The original technique proposes retrieving the index and using the trap door again as a key to 
hash the document id to search for that word in the Bloom filter. Because of the modification 
during indexing, now the searcher has to first decrypt the document id and hash the decrypted 
document id with trap door as the key to search for that word in the Bloom filter. 
Let‟s say there are U unique words in a document comprising N words (words repeat in a 
document for example, the, a, and, are). Goh [2004] recommends adding X random words (X = 
Total number of words (N) - Number of unique words (U)) to be IND-CKA semantically secure. 
Therefore the Bloom filter indexes of two identical length documents have same number of 
words mapped to the index irrespective of number of unique words in the documents. This 
project modifies the technique in the view of additional functionality while promising same 
security. Instead of mapping X random words, the repeated occurrence information of the word 
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can be mapped; for example, the word „this2‟ is added to bloom filter index for the second 
occurrence of word „this‟. The „Word<N>‟, where N is the nth repeated occurrence of the word 
is mapped as this would lay the basis for future enhancement where the searcher could return 
search results ordered by the number of occurrences of the search word. 
4.1.1.1.1 Analysis 
During the indexing process, storing an encrypted document id strengthens the security, as the 
document id information is not leaked with the index being stored on un-trusted storage. While 
this may look like an additional precaution, the main reason this project recommends this is to 
strengthen the index against security attacks during the search process. This design strengthens 
the security of the index against Replay attack and Brute force attack models. Security and the 
performance tradeoffs associated with this modification is analysed further in the Evaluation 
section.  
4.1.2 Design Notation 
This project follows the boxes and arrow style for representing components in a design and the 
connections between them. Moreover, a magnetic disc symbol is used to represent a storage unit 
and the physical machines are labelled with „Machine‟ in their name. In Logical view the boxes 
represent the logical components and the arrows represent the dependencies between the 
components with arrow pointing towards the depended component. In the runtime view, boxes 
represent executable components with arrows representing flow of control or flow of data. 
4.1.3 Logical View 
This section describes the high level interaction between the logical components of Secure 
Searcher and an existing email client with end-to-end encryption setup. The functionality of each 
logical component is detailed below. 
 
Figure 4-1 Secure Searcher Logical Design 
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4.1.3.1 Indexer 
Email Client interacts with the Indexer component for indexing encrypted email messages. This 
could be a live interaction i.e., the client invokes the Indexer whenever it receives new messages 
or it could be an offline interaction where the client periodically (hourly or daily) indexes the 
messages. Moreover, Email Client may pass the encrypted message to the Indexer or the client 
could decrypt the message and send only the plain text message for indexing.  
The indexing is based on unique message Id associated with each email message and the index is 
stored in Email Index (database) with the help of Data Manager. 
4.1.3.2 Searcher 
Email client interacts with Searcher component for searching encrypted email messages. 
Searcher accepts the search word and returns the unique message Ids whose message bodies may 
contain the searched word. 
4.1.3.3 Data Manager 
Data Manager decouples the data store implementation type from the Indexer and Searcher 
components. Data Manager manages the connection to the data store and enables storing and 
retrieving the index data to and from the data store. 
4.1.3.4 Key Manager 
Key Manager enables Indexer and Searcher components to retrieve the indexing key used for 
creating a secure email index. Key Manager exposes the functionality to import and securely 
store this indexing key with the help of Crypto Libraries. 
Email Client may interact with Key Manager to store the keys used for encryption/decryption 
purpose as part of the end-to-end email communication. This process may not be needed if the 
Email Client handles the decryption process and sends only the plain text message for indexing. 
But if the Email Client needs the Indexer to index encrypted messages then the Indexer requests 
the Key Manager for corresponding decryption key. Hence in the latter case the decryption key 
need to be stored by Email Client using Key Manager. 
4.1.3.5 Encryption Utilities 
Encryption Utilities exposes hashing and encryption/decryption functionalities with the help of 
Crypto Libraries. Crypto Libraries are collection open source standard libraries enabling full 
strength cryptographic operations. 
4.1.4 Deployment View 
This section describes the recommended deployment approach for the secure search 
functionality. The next figure shows User 1 having access to two machines Local Machine 1 and 
Local Machine 2 to perform email operations using a same email account. 
User 1 logs in to the email client on Local Machine 1 and checks for new messages. Any new 
messages are indexed in the Email Index store on the Local Machine 1. If there is a need for 
backup or portability, the stored secure Email Index could be backed up in a remote storage on 
the cloud. 
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To illustrate the portability of the functionality, let‟s say the User1 logs in to the Email Client 
from another machine Local Machine 2. The designed solution requires merely a synchronisation 
between the local Email Index and the remote cloud Email Index store. This negates the need to 
download and index all the already indexed email messages again on the Local Machine 2. Local 
Machine 2 could be a new machine with Email Client and Secure Searcher installed or an 
alternate machine that is used by the User1 on regular basis. 
 
Figure 4-2 Secure Searcher Deployment Design 
Though the description uses two machines to illustrate portability of the solution, the secure 
searcher portability could be extended to N machines. 
4.1.4.1 Alternative Approaches 
The above approach is recommended owing to the simplicity of deployment coupled with the 
security of the search mechanism. This section describes the alternative approaches that were 
considered and reasons their limitations. 
4.1.4.1.1 Remote Secure Search Server 
The deployment approach described in this section requires a single remote search server 
deployed on the cloud with which email clients could interact for indexing and searching. 
This approach has the advantage of having a single deployment of Secure Searcher as opposed to 
the recommended approach‟s requirement of secure searcher configuration on all local machines 
used for email communication. A serious limitation of this approach is that the Secure Searcher 
needs access to the decrypted messages for indexing purpose. Moreover, any attacker having 
access to the Secure Searcher could perform search operation on the stored Email Index.  
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Figure 4-3 Secure Searcher Remote Server Alternative Deployment Design 
Hence the remote Secure Search server needs to be a trusted server which restricts the access 
only to the authenticated users and protects the Secure Searcher from the In-Memory attack i.e., 
the keys and decrypted messages are available in memory of the executing program during 
indexing and searching purpose and is vulnerable to attack. 
4.1.4.1.2 Secure Searcher Client and Server 
This deployment approach tries to minimise the security vulnerability in the previous Remote 
Secure Search Server approach by splitting the Secure Searcher functionality between the Local 
Machine and remote server. The solution design is depicted in the figure below. 
 
Figure 4-4 Secure Searcher Client Server Alternative Deployment Design 
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The functionality of Secure Search client and the server during indexing and searching process 
are described in the following sections. 
4.1.4.1.2.1 Indexing 
When a new message needs to be indexed by the Secure Search Client, the client indexes the 
message and sends the index (encrypted message Id and Bloom filter) to the Secure Search 
Server. Secure Search Server on receipt of the index, stores them in the Email Index store. 
4.1.4.1.2.2 Searching 
During the Search process, Secure Search Client creates a trap door for the received search word. 
Trap door is a hashed word created using a keyed hash function where only the client could 
create the corresponding hashed value while it would be hard for an attacker without the key. 
The trap door is then sent to the Secure Search Server which performs the search and returns the 
message Ids of messages containing the searched word. 
4.1.4.1.2.3 Analysis 
This approach is strong against the In-Memory attack vulnerability of the previous approach as 
the Secure Search Server does not have access to the keys or plain text messages during 
indexing. Moreover, only the Secure Search Client can perform the search operation as only the 
client can generate trap door with a key. 
But the major limitations of this approach are during search operation, where the deployed 
Secure Search Server is vulnerable to frequency analysis attack. Suppose the user searchers for a 
word „SearchWord‟ then the Secure Search Client creates a trapdoor for „SearchWord‟ let‟s say 
„TrapDoorWord‟. Secure Search Server receives the trapdoor „TrapDoorWord‟ performs the 
search and returns the result message Ids. Now the attacker having access to the Secure Search 
Server could analyse that a certain word is possibly found in the email messages based on the 
number of results. The number of search results acts as a vulnerability to perform frequency 
analysis attack. Having access to history of such searched „TrapDoorWords‟ and results, the 
attacker could determine the corresponding „SearchWord‟ for the „TrapDoorWord‟ leaking the 
information that „SearchWord‟ is present in the resulted messages. 
Another serious limitation with this approach is it suffers from the Replay attack. If the attacker 
gets access to a „TrapDoorWord‟ and the remote server, the same trap door could be used in 
future to check for the presence of the corresponding „SearchWord‟. 
Hence the remote Cloud server where the Secure Server is deployed needs to be a trusted server. 
Moreover, a remote un-trusted server could block or modify the search results or the index 
asserting the requirement of a trusted remote server. 
4.1.4.1.3 Single Remote Email Index Data Store 
This deployment approach is stronger than the previous split approach with only the data store 
being stored in the remote un-trusted cloud storage. 
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Figure 4-5 Secure Searcher Remote Storage Alternative Deployment Design 
When a new message needs to be indexed, the Secure Searcher sends the encrypted message Id 
and corresponding index to store in the database. While searching, the stored indices are 
retrieved from the Email Index data store sequentially or in batch and searched for the presence 
of search word.  
4.1.4.1.3.1 Analysis 
Even though the search results or search word are not known to the remote storage, the data 
access history during the search operation leaks information that a certain word may be 
found/not found in accessed rows. Let‟s say the default search configuration displays 20 search 
results for initial search and only the first 20 rows of the Email Index data store are accessed. 
Then this data access pattern leaks the information that a certain word is found in each of the first 
20 email index.  Similarly if the search operation accesses all the rows, then the information that 
the corresponding search word may not be found in all index is leaked. This could act as a basis 
of frequency analysis attack which could be avoided using an oblivious data store that hides the 
history of access patterns. 
This approach may be slightly more vulnerable than the recommended deployment approach. 
But the key reason that this project recommends a local index store in synchronisation with the 
remote data store is to increase the performance. The usage of cryptography libraries in the 
Secure Searcher produces considerable delay in the search operation. Using a remote index store 
for search operation might increase the delay further. But with current faster network services 
and the designed space efficient index, this may be negligible and needs to be asserted with 
further experiments. 
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4.2 Library Design 
This section describes the high level design of the implemented library. It begins with the logical 
view followed by the description of run time interactions between the components. 
4.2.1 Logical View 
This section describes the logical components of the implementation along with the 
corresponding mapping to the implementation packages in the source code environment. The 
design follows the layered approach with the responsibilities divided among three layers Client, 
Server and Data Store. Each layer exposes APIs (Application Programming Interfaces) that are 
consumed by the layer left or above to it. 
The next figure shows the major logical components in the implemented library and their 
dependencies. Each logical component and its functionalities are described as follows. 
4.2.1.1 Secure Search Client 
This component encompasses the Client side functionality described in the Secure Searcher 
Client and Server deployment approach. It corresponds to the package org.maynooth.client in the 
implementation structure. 
A separate logical component for client and server is used, even though this project recommends 
only a two-tier deployment approach comprising Secure Searcher with a local database on local 
machine and a remote database on cloud storage. The separation of logical client and server 
provide scope for future extensions and logical separation of functionalities.  
The Secure Search Client handles integration with the email client and performs core of the 
indexing functionality where as Secure Search Server handles integration with Data Store and 
the core of searching functionality. 
 
Figure 4-6 Secure Searcher Logical View 
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4.2.1.1.1 Indexer 
Client Indexer exposes APIs for indexing both encrypted and plain messages to the data store. 
For indexing an encrypted message it utilises the Decrypter component to decrypt the contents 
and it creates a Bloom filter data structure representing the index of the message. It passes the 
index information to the Server Indexer for storage. This component corresponds to 
org.maynooth.client.indexer package in the implementation structure. 
4.2.1.1.2 Searcher 
Client Searcher exposes APIs for searching in the indexed messages and returns a list of message 
Ids whose contents may contain the searched word.  Furthermore, it exposes API to search for 
words in a particular message and returns a Boolean value indicating presence or absence of the 
searched words.  
For the input search word, it creates a trap door search word and passes the trap door to Server 
Searcher for searching. The maximum number of results returned depends on the Searcher 
configuration settings. This component corresponds to org.maynooth.client.searcher package in 
the implementation structure 
4.2.1.1.3 Decrypter 
Indexer on receiving encrypted messages for indexing invokes the Decrypter component which 
employs Chain of Responsibility design pattern to perform the decryption functionality. 
Decrypter corresponds to org.maynooth.client.indexer.decrypter package in the implementation 
structure. 
 
Figure 4-7 Decrypter Logical Design - Chain of Responsibility 
As depicted in the class diagram above, Indexer client gets the Decrypter chain from 
DecrypterManager and invokes decrypt on the message. Decrypter chain first checks the 
OpenPGPDecrypter for decryption, if the message is not OpenPGP encrypted or if the 
corresponding key is not present in the key store the responsibility then goes to the next 
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successor SmimeDecrypter. If none of the Decrypter in the chain could handle the message then 
the message is not indexed.  
Chain of Responsibility pattern enables easy integration for future extension of new decrypter 
functionality. This would involve specialising the Decrypter and modifying DecrypterManager 
to add the new specialised Decrypter to the chain. 
4.2.1.1.4 Key Manager 
Key Manager corresponds to org.maynooth.client.keystore package in the implementation 
structure. It consists of three major components described as follows. 
 KeyStoreManager enables creation of a new key store and deletion of the existing key store. 
It also exposes API to retrieve the key used for indexing purpose. 
 PGPKeyManager enables importing and retrieving keys used for OpenPGP decryption. 
 SmimeKeyManager enables importing and retrieving keys used for S/MIME decryption. 
4.2.1.2 Secure Search Server 
This component encompasses the Server side functionality described in the Secure Searcher 
Client and Server deployment approach. It handles the majority of searching functionality and 
corresponds to the package org.maynooth.server in the implementation structure. The logical 
components of the server are detailed as follows. 
4.2.1.2.1 Indexer 
Server Indexer acts as a connector to the data store for passing the encrypted message Id and the 
corresponding Bloom filter index for storage. This component corresponds to 
org.maynooth.server.indexer package in the implementation structure. 
4.2.1.2.2 Searcher 
Server Searcher on receiving the trapdoor invokes the data store to retrieve indices and performs 
the requested search. This component corresponds to org.maynooth.server.searcher package in 
the implementation structure. 
4.2.1.3 Encryption Utilities 
Encryption Utilities exposes two functionalities; a keyed hash function known as HMAC 
[Krawczyk et al. 1997] function and a symmetric encryption functionality. The algorithm or 
standard used for hashing and encryption depends on the Encryption Configuration settings. This 
component corresponds to org.maynooth.encryptionUtil package in the implementation 
structure. 
4.2.1.4 Data Store 
Data Store corresponds to org.maynooth.datastore package in the implementation structure. It 
consists of three major components described as follows 
 Data Manager creates and closes the connection to the database. The connection parameters 
depend on the Data Store Configuration settings. 
 Data Storer exposes APIs for indexing purpose which includes inserting a new index, 
removing an existing index and querying if the index already exists. 
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 Data Searcher exposes APIs for searching the data store and returns the indices containing 
message id and Bloom filter index upon retrieve index operation by Server Searcher. 
4.2.2 Runtime View 
This section describes the run time interaction flow between the components of the library during 
indexing and searching process. 
4.2.2.1 Indexing Runtime View 
Indexing runtime view describes run time interaction between the logical components of Secure 
Searcher during a typical indexing process where a new message is indexed by the Secure 
Searcher. 
 
Figure 4-8 Indexing Runtime View 
EmailIndexerClient on receiving a request to index email messages retrieves the indexing key 
from the Key Manager and then uses Decrypter to decrypt the email message if it is an encrypted 
message. EmailIndexerClient then uses Encryption Utilities to create an index for the message 
and sends it to the server for indexing. EmailIndexerServer invokes Data Manager for getting a 
connection and then stores the index to the Data Store. 
4.2.2.2 Searching Runtime View 
Searching runtime view describes the run time interactions between the logical components of 
Secure Searcher for a typical search operation where the Searcher is queried for messages 
containing the search word. 
EmailSearcherClient on receiving a search request invokes Key Manager to get the indexing key 
and then uses Encryption Utilities to create a trap door word corresponding to the search word. 
Trap door word is then sent to EmailSearcherServer which retrieves the index records from Data 
Store to search for the records that satisfy the requested operation. EmailSearcherServer uses 
Encryption Utilities and Key Manager for the search operation and returns the message Ids of 
messages containing the searched word to the EmailSearcherClient. 
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Figure 4-9 Searching Runtime View 
4.3 Integration Design 
This section describes the high level design for the integration of the implemented library with 
an existing email client. This section includes the integration design for indexing operation 
followed by the design for search operation. 
4.3.1.1 Indexing Integration 
Integration design proposed by this project for indexing purpose using the Secure Searcher is 
depicted in the next figure. As shown in the design diagram, there are two high level indexing 
operations supported by this design numbered as 1 and 2. 
 
Figure 4-10 Indexing Integration Design 
37 
 
The first one is a support for full or first time indexing operation, where all the existing old 
messages in the email client need to be indexed by Secure Searcher. Email client retrieves all the 
messages for the configured email account and sends it to the EmailIndexerClient. 
EmailIndexerClient indexes the messaged based on retrieved indexer configuration property 
settings such as key store, database, Bloom filter and encryption settings.  
The second one is a support for an incremental index operation, where new messages are indexed 
and the deleted messages are removed from the index store. Email client listens for any new 
messages or deletion of messages and invokes EmailIndexerClient to index or remove an 
existing index. 
4.3.1.2 Searching Integration 
Integration design proposed by this project for search operation using Secure Searcher is 
described in this section. 
 
Figure 4-11 Searching Integration Design 
Email client on receiving a search request from the user, invokes the search operation on 
EmailSearcherClient. EmailSearcherClient performs the search operation utilising the default 
Searcher configuration settings such as key store, searcher, database, Bloom filter and encryption 
settings and then returns the message ids of messages that may contain the searched word. The 
results are then processed by the email client and the corresponding email message data is 
retrieved from the Email Store for display. Email Store may be a local cache of messages stored 
by email client or the remote mail server containing the messages. 
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5 Implementation 
This chapter details the implementation approach adhered to by the project. It begins with the 
core library implementation details followed by the email client integration implementation 
details and concludes with the encrypted email generator approach. Each section includes a 
summary of key decisions made and the challenges faced during the implementation. 
5.1 Core Library Implementation 
This section describes the implementation details of the core library developed by this project. At 
first, indexer implementation details are described, followed by the key manager and encryption 
utilities information. Then the approach for searcher implementation is detailed and this section 
concludes with the data manager details. 
5.1.1 Indexer 
Indexer extracts the message Id from the message and encrypts it with the indexing key obtained 
from key manager and encryption utilities. Then it parses the message content and creates a 
Bloom filter as the index of the message, the index creation details are outlined as follows. 
5.1.1.1 Index Content 
Indexer decrypts the message body and splits the message body into individual words.  The 
subject of the email message and attachments are not indexed owing to the following rationales.  
 Subject lines are not considered as they are not encrypted by the end-to-end encryption 
tools. This is due to the fact that the spam filters on the mail servers works on the basis of 
subject line of the message as well. Hence the subject line of the email message could be 
searched by the default search service provided by the mail service provider.  
 Current tools that support end-to-end encrypted email communication do not have 
support for encryption of attachments and hence indexing such attachments is considered 
out of scope for the project. 
For splitting the message body into individual words, a regular expression "[^A-Za-z0-9]+" is 
used. Therefore any character other than the alphabets and numbers is considered as a delimiter 
to split the message. Alternative approach would be to use white space characters as delimiter 
but if employed then the words like “Thanks,” will be indexed including comma in it. A more 
sophisticated delimiter would anticipate all such possibilities in words depending on the user 
expectations. This project sticks with the initial regular expression and translates each word to a 
case insensitive word for simplicity and usability. 
5.1.1.2 Bloom Filter 
This project uses Java BitSet [Oracle 2014] data structure to represent Bloom filter. The size of 
the Bloom filter, number of words mapped to the Bloom filter and number of hash functions 
used for mappings during the indexing process determines the false positive rate associated with 
the search process. The number of words (N) extracted from the message body multiplied by the 
Bloom filter configuration parameter „NumberOfBitsPerWord‟ (B) is taken as the Bloom filter 
size (M). This project uses „NumberOfHashFunctions‟ configuration parameter to determine the 
number of hash functions used for mapping words to the Bloom filter.   
Bloom filter size M = (Number of words in the message N) * (Bits per word configuration B) 
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These configuration parameters are the properties files in the „configuration‟ folder of the 
project. This could be overridden by the integrated email client and changed at the run time. 
More specifically, all changes to the configuration properties in the Secure Searcher should made 
before running the first or full index operation. If the parameters are changed after the index 
operation then the search operation may not work. As the search operation expects the 
configuration to remain same as it was during the indexing stage. 
Each word is hashed using encryption utilities with a pseudo key as the key and then hashed 
word is again used as the key to hash the message id. Then the final hashed word is mapped to 
the Bloom filter using r hash functions, details of the mappings are described in the next section. 
A pseudo key is a random byte array (32 byte) generated using Secure Random with indexing 
key as the key. Pseudo keys are used to generate n keys from a single key (indexing key) or for 
the key with required key length (32 byte) to make the implementation independent of the size of 
the indexing key used. It is recommended that key size be at least equal to the block size the data 
processed by the hashing/encryption function [Krawczyk et al. 1997], which is 32 byte (256/8) 
for the default hash function (HmacSHA256). 256 bits is set as the default hashing key size in 
the encryption configuration, though a smaller key size would be padded up with 0s on the right 
to get the right key size. 
5.1.1.3 Challenges in Indexer implementation 
A challenge during the indexing was to identify r hash functions depending on the Bloom filter 
configuration parameters. The initial idea was to use inbuilt hash functions with r pseudo keys 
generated based on the original key. But then each hashed value which is a 256 bit length value 
(HmacSHA256) needs to be mapped to the Bloom filter index from 0 to M.  
This project decided to adapt the implementation approach used by an existing Bloom filter 
implementation [MagnusS 2011]. Here instead of using r pseudo keys for r hash functions, first a 
pseudo key is created and then the hashed value is split into 4 byte blocks (32 bits) and the 
absolute value is taken as an integer. This integer mod the Bloom filter size is used to map to the 
index 0 to M. So a single hashed 256 bit value could be mapped to 8 (256/32) Bloom filter index. 
If more hash functions are needed i.e., r > 8 the next pseudo key is created to generate the next 
hashed value. This provides a simple and light weight mapping instead of generating r pseudo 
keys and using r keyed hash functions which are both costly operations. 
5.1.1.4 Decrypter 
The major challenge with the implementation is decrypting the initial encrypted message for 
indexing. There are simple examples for decrypting OpenPGP and S/MIME encrypted contents 
using bouncy castle library [Wiki ServiceNow 2012b; Bouncy Castle 2015]. While it was 
straight forward to extract OpenPGP encrypted body content, extracting the message content 
from the S/MIME encrypted mail message was the major challenge. For S/MIME messages the 
default message.getContent() returns mime multi-parts which needs to be parsed to extract the 
encrypted content. The extracted content contained varied headers in the content depending on 
the client or library (bouncy castle) used to create S/MIME encrypted message. This project 
adopted an approach to get the raw input stream of the message part and parse it manually. The 
raw input stream of the message body part parsing needed to be modified to adopt for mail dir 
message format and multi-part (plain and html) message bodies.  
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5.1.2 Key Manager 
Key manager provides functionalities to import OpenPGP and S/MIME keys that could be used 
for indexing or decryption. The major challenge was to decide on how to store the keys on the 
client machine. Initially password protected S/MIME pfx (Personal Information Exchange) file 
and the default encrypted OpenPGP key was used by the Key Manager. While S/MIME could be 
imported to a JKS (Java Key Store), this project could not find a standard way to store OpenPGP 
keys that is usable by a Java library. This implementation converted the imported OpenPGP key 
to a key and certificate pair so that it could be stored in JKS [Bouncy Castle Inc 2014]. This 
approach was used so there is a common key store for both the keys and the key store is 
protected by a single password. This promotes usability requiring user to input a single password 
for indexing or decryption of both OpenPGP and S/MIME messages, irrespective of the 
passwords used to protect the source S/MIME pfx file and OpenPGP keys. 
5.1.3 Encryption Utilities 
The encryption utilities provides two functionalities, a keyed hashing function called HMAC 
[Krawczyk et al. 1997] and a symmetric encryption function. The bouncy castle crypto library 
[Bouncy Castle Inc 2013] is used for the implementation of these functions. Bouncy castle was 
used as it provides support for both OpenPGP and S/MIME from older release of JDK 1.3 and 
there is good support online indicating the use of library on other successful products. While 
there are number of libraries for GPG [Yemini 2010; daniele athome et al. 2015], One other 
library considered for the project is Cryptix [Cryptix 2005] which claimed to provide good 
support for PGP but was deactivated on 2005. 
The default configuration employs HmacSHA256 and AES256 as keyed hashing and symmetric 
encryption functions respectively. These standards are approved by NIST (National Institute of 
Standards and Technology) and the standard used is configurable by changing the encryption 
configuration properties settings, provided the bouncy castle library supports them. 
Other NIST approved keyed hash functions are SHA-224, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA-512/224 
and SHA-512/256 and the approved encryption standards are Triple DES and Skipjack [NIPS 
2015; NIST 2014]. 
5.1.4 Searcher 
Searcher follows the same operations performed by the indexer for each word in message but on 
the search word and invokes Data Manager to get the index and then for each message index it 
decrypts the message id and uses the decrypted message id to check for the membership of the 
word in that Bloom filter message index. 
5.1.5 Data Manager 
Data Manager provides connection to the database for storing and retrieving indices. This project 
uses JDBC (Java Data Base Connectivity) driver with the configurable connection parameters to 
allow runtime portability across different database types. Data Manager is a singleton class, 
providing a single connection to the database while it could be extended to manage a pool of 
connections for improving performance. Initially this project used JavaDB or Apache Derby 
[Oracle 2015d] as a local file database due to the straight forward support from within Java. But 
this project noticed a considerable delay in database operations. Hence this project moved to use 
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HSQLDB [HyperSQL 2014] as a local file database, as it promised to be another light weight 
database written in Java guaranteeing comparatively increased performance. 
5.2 Integration Implementation 
This section describes the integration details with Columba email client for a live integration and 
integration with Maildir for offline testing. Both the integrations accepts default configuration 
parameters provided as part of the library. 
5.2.1 Columba Client Integration 
This section begins with the indexing integration details followed by the searcher and text viewer 
details. For integration, the Secure Searcher library eclipse project is added as a depended project 
to the Columba email client project [Dietz et al. 2013]. 
5.2.1.1 Indexing Integration 
As described in the integration design section the implementation includes two indexing support. 
The first or full time indexing implementation involved creating a Utility Menu „Index All 
Encrypted Messages...‟ and displaying an Index dialog corresponding to the implementation file 
„org.columba.mail.gui.action.IndexMailDialog‟. The implementation is similar to the existing 
functionality provided by Columba for exporting email messages. In a nut shell, instead of 
exporting email with an ExportFolderCommand implementation, Index email support invokes 
the indexing command „org.columba.mail.folder.command.IndexFolderCommand‟ where each 
email message is retrieved and EmailClientIndexer of the Secure Searcher is invoked to index 
the message. Before starting the indexing process, the data store is cleared as it is a full index 
operation. 
For incremental indexing, initially this project tried to add „IMailCheckingListener’ to check for 
new messages. But the notification of new messages with this listener was inconsistent; 
moreover there was no notification for deleted messages. So this project added a listener on 
Inbox folder implementing the Columba „IFolderListener‟ interface called 
„org.maynooth.indexer.integration.MailIndexerListener‟ as it provided consistent notification for 
both new and deleted messages. 
5.2.1.2 Searcher Integration 
For searcher integration, a new search type „Encrypted Body Contains‟ is added to the search 
filter combo menu in „org.columba.mail.gui.filtertoolbar.FilterToolbar‟. And the 
„DefaultSearchEngine‟ is modified to invoke the new filter plug-in for the encrypted message 
search „org.columba.mail.filter.plugins.EncryptedBodyFilter‟. 
The encrypted body filter gets the filter search pattern, the source folder (Inbox) and message id 
as input. And it returns a Boolean value indicating whether the search pattern is found in the 
message body of the message invoking „EmailSearcherClient’. It is possible to extend it to a 
more efficient implementation that invokes „EmailSearcherClient’ once to get all message ids, 
instead of invoking the Searcher for each message id. This project decided to follow the former 
approach for a standard conformance with other filter plug-ins developed within Columba. 
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5.2.1.2.1 Challenges in Searcher Integration 
Columba has two search facilities. One is a quick search that was integrated with this project and 
another one is a detailed search. The detailed search supports conjunctions „And‟, „Or‟ among 
searches on multiple search fields such as subject, to and cc fields of the email message. This 
project initially attempted to integrate with detailed search but the work flow of detailed search 
could not be easily identified and it repeatedly crossed over with the quick search 
implementation. This project then chose to integrate with quick search and the detailed search 
integration is moved as future work. 
5.2.1.3 Text Viewer 
Columba does not have an inbuilt support to decrypt the encrypted message. So this project 
modified the „org.columba.mail.gui.message.viewer.TextViewer‟ to display the encrypted 
message. This involved identifying the encrypted message body and invoking the „Decrypter’ 
implementation to get the decrypted contents. This integration demonstrates an additional 
capability supported by the implemented library. 
5.2.2 Maildir Integration 
This section describes the implementation details of the integration with Maildir for offline 
testing. At first, the mail storage format details are described followed by the mail server and 
client simulator details. 
5.2.2.1 Mail Storage 
This project uses Maildir [Qmail 2015] as an offline storage mechanism where each email 
message is represented as a separate Maildir file. The JavaMaildir [Zhukov 2002] library is used 
for parsing and reading the messages. 
Initially, this project investigated IMAP (Internet Message Access Protocol) [Crispin 2003] and 
Gmail Rest APIs [Google 2015] for retrieving email messages for indexing. But then, it decided 
to use an offline mechanism to enable better support for the development environment. Initial 
storage format used was Mbox [Hall 2005] where all messages are stored in a single Mbox file. 
Gmail supports exporting email messages in Mbox format and the file is parsed using Mstor Java 
library [Fortuna 2014]. But the major issue during development phase was the complexity 
associated with modifying the original Mbox file for adding or deleting messages. So this project 
moved to Maildir format where adding/removing messages would imply adding or removing 
(renaming) the corresponding Maildir files in the Maildir source folder. 
5.2.2.2 Mail Server Simulation 
For offline simulation, this project created an email client implementation in the 
„org.maynooth.mailreader.client‟ source package. The client registers two listeners with the 
server and is used to listen for new and deleted messages. Server uses a polling mechanism to 
poll periodically for the message changes (addition/deletion) and notifies the registered client 
listeners. 
A major challenge in the simulation was that JavaMaildir [Zhukov 2002] library used for parsing 
Maildir files had full support for UNIX format files and it had issues in Windows development 
environment used for the project. For example, for deletion of messages JavaMaildir renames the 
corresponding file with “:2ST” at the end indicating the message has been seen and trashed. But 
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Windows environment does not allow the special character colon “:” in a file name. So this 
project used a work around of creating a new folder (deletedmessages) whose new messages 
were interpreted as deleted messages. 
This integration could also act as a core for full pledged offline indexer and searcher that allows 
searching encrypted email messages stored or exported in Mbox or Maildir format. In view of 
the future extensions, the initial Mbox reader implementation is retained in the project even 
though they are not used for the project‟s offline testing. 
5.3 Encrypted Email Generator 
This section details the encrypted email generator implemented for the performance testing of 
the library. The generator generates encrypted email from an input plain text data; this includes 
OpenPGP and S/MIME email generation. 
The implementations belong to the package „org.maynooth.mailgenerator‟. These two were the 
challenging parts next to the decryption implementation discussed earlier. While S/MIME 
encryption was straightforward from S/MIME examples, the corresponding decryption has to be 
modified so that it handles the S/MIME generated email messages as well. Writing OpenPGP 
encrypted email message was about finding a right OpenPGP encryption example [Archive 
2015]. The final example was not easily searchable for reference and the examples that were 
tried initially [Wiki ServiceNow 2012a; Fastpicket 2012; Sloanseaman 2012] were incomplete or 
using old version of Bouncy Castle APIs. 
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6 Secure Searcher 
This chapter describes the final functionalities exposed by the project. Due to the performance 
loss described in the next section, the symmetric encryption/decryption utility functionality is 
turned off in the final implementation. Other functionalities are exposed as per the design and 
implementation chapters. At first, details of the APIs (Application Programming Interfaces) 
exposed by the implemented library are described, followed by the functionalities that were 
assessed using a live integration with the Columba email client. 
6.1 Implementation Library 
This section details the APIs exposed by the implemented library for consumption by external 
email clients. At first, two major APIs (Indexer and Searcher) are outlined which are followed by 
Key manager and Decrypter APIs. 
6.1.1 Indexer 
The indexing APIs are exposed as part of the ‘org.maynooth.client.indexer.EmailIndexerClient’ 
interface implementation. The major APIs are listed as follows and the Java docs contain the 
detailed documentation of the APIs. 
void addEncryptedMessagesToIndex(Iterator<Message> messages) 
void addPlainMessagesToIndex(Iterator<Message> messages) 
void deleteMessagesFromIndex(Iterator<Message> messages) 
boolean isMessageIndexed(Message message) 
The message objects accepted as part of the APIs are of type javax.mail.Message [Oracle 2013a]. 
The interface can be instantiated with the corresponding „EmailIndexerClientImpl‟ 
implementation for usage. 
The implemented functionality delegates the responsibility of possible exceptions while parsing 
message or using cryptographic APIs to the email clients. Therefore the email client is 
responsible for notifying users or taking appropriate roll back options; this strategy is used for all 
other exposed functionalities. 
In addition to the above APIs, similar APIs that accepts an additional message id parameter is 
introduced to support email client integration. This is due to the possibility that the email clients 
may store messages using their custom message Id instead of the message id header as part of the 
email message. For example, Columba email client employed numbers for message ids while the 
message id that is part of an email message needs to conform to a recommended format with 
ankle brackets [Crocker 1982].  
6.1.2 Searcher 
The Searcher APIs are exposed as part of ‘org.maynooth.client.searcher.EmailSearcherClient’ 
interface implementation. The major APIs are listed as follows and the Java docs contain the 
detailed documentation of the APIs. 
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List<byte[]> searchAllMessages(String searchWord) 
List<byte[]> searchAllMessagesForAnded(List<String> searchWordList) 
List<byte[]> searchAllMessagesForOred(List<String> searchWordList) 
The result values are a list of message ids returned as a byte array for security and neutral 
character encoding implementation. Similar to Indexer, Searcher contains additional APIs with 
message id as an additional parameter to search within a specific message and they return a 
Boolean value indicating the presence or absence of the searched word. Searcher can be 
instantiated with the „EmailSearcherClientImpl‟ implementation for usage. 
6.1.3 Key Manager 
The major key manager APIs exposed as part of the package ‘org.maynooth.client.keystore’ for 
external email clients are listed as follows. 
KeyStoreManager.createKeyStore(char[] password) 
KeyStoreManager.generateSessionKey(char[] keyStorePassword) 
KeyStoreManager.deleteSessionKey()  
Above APIs use the key store configuration property setting to get the key store file location. In 
addition to the above APIs there are overloaded APIs that accepts key store file path and 
password as additional parameters.  
Email client can generate the key for session; this is the indexing key needed for indexing or 
searching using Secure Searcher. Email client is responsible for maintaining the session time 
during which the key is stored in memory of the indexer. After the session time out, email client 
may delete the key. Secure Searcher uses lazy loading of the key and the key is loaded during the 
first actual search or index operation. 
If the integrated email client needs Secure Searcher to index OpenPGP or S/MIME encrypted 
messages then the corresponding keys needs to be loaded into the key store.  Email client needs 
to load the PGP and/or S/MIME keys before the indexing process so that the Secure Searcher 
could decrypt the messages for indexing. 
PGPKeyManager.loadPGPKeyToKeyStore(String pgpFile, char[] pgpPassword) 
SmimeKeyManager.loadPfxfileToKeystore(String pfxFile, char[] pfxPassword) 
Secure Searcher uses IndexKeyAlias and SmimeAlias key store configuration settings for loading 
the appropriate key from the key store. For OpenPGP decryption, the public key Id part of the 
encrypted data is used to search for the corresponding key in the key store. This enables multiple 
PGP keys and one S/MIME key per user as the S/MIME certificate is typically allocated to the 
user (email address) by CA (Certificate Authority). 
6.1.4 Decrypter 
The major decrypter APIs exposed as part of the ‘org.maynooth.client.indexer.decrypter’ 
package that are usable by an external email client are listed below. These can be used for 
decrypting the message (Java mail) or decrypting the content. 
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byte[] DecrypterManager.getDecrypterChain().decrypt(Message message) 
The above API decrypts the input message and returns the decrypted message body. 
byte[] decryptBytes(byte[] encryptedBytes) 
The above API exposed in the OpenPGPDecrypter and SmimeDecrypter can be used by the 
email client as part of its implementation to decrypt the respective encrypted contents. 
6.2 Columba Search Functionality 
This section details the search functionality implemented as part of the integration with Columba 
email client. It begins with the indexing functionality followed by searching and then concludes 
with the text viewer functionality. 
6.2.1 Indexing 
To perform initial indexing of already existing email messages, a utility menu is created which 
indexes all existing encrypted emails. This option would clear the index store and load new 
indices to the data store. The figure below shows the full index dialog box where the folder to be 
indexed needs to be selected.  
 
Figure 6-1 Columba Indexing Dialog 
Whenever a new message arrives at the Columba client or if a message is deleted in the Columba 
client, the incremental indexer would automatically perform the corresponding index or remove 
operation at the backend. 
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6.2.2 Searching 
To illustrate the search functionality, consider an S/MIME encrypted message sent to the setup 
email account (SecureSearch2015@gmail.com). The figure below shows the Gmail web viewer 
which does not recognise the encrypted email and is shown as an attachment smime.p7m. 
 
Figure 6-2 Gmail S/MIME message 
The same message is received using the integrated Columba email client and the encrypted 
message body was searched for the word in the message body „livesmime‟. The figure below 
shows the search result indicating the corresponding encrypted message. The same functionality 
is implemented for OpenPGP encrypted messages as well. 
 
Figure 6-3 Columba S/MIME Message 
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6.2.3 Text Viewer 
Columba does not have a default support for viewing encrypted messages. The Decrypter APIs 
exposed by the library is used to view the encrypted message content in Columba‟s text viewer. 
The previous figure shows the corresponding functionality where an S/MIME encrypted message 
is viewed in the Columba‟s text viewer.  
To illustrate OpenPGP decryption functionality, consider an OpenPGP encrypted message sent 
to the setup email account (SecureSearch2015@gmail.com). The figure below shows the Gmail 
web viewer with the encrypted message content. 
 
Figure 6-4 Gmail OpenPGP Message 
The same email when viewed using the Columba client displays the decrypted message content 
as depicted in the next figure. 
 
Figure 6-5 Columba OpenPGP Message 
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6.2.4 Key store Configuration 
The key store configuration dialog enables importing PGP and S/MIME private keys to the key 
store. These keys are used for decrypting the encrypted messages for indexing. By default 
S/MIME key is used as the indexing key, this setting along with other default configurations can 
be modified in the indexConfiguration.xml at Columba home directory. 
 
Figure 6-6 Columba KeyStore Configuration 
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7 Evaluation 
This chapter outlines how the developed system satisfies the objectives and conforms to the 
strategies that were initially adopted. And then it critically analyses the functionality, 
performance and security of the implementation. 
7.1 Objectives 
This project answers the core research question regarding the feasibility of securely searching 
encrypted email messages with different design approaches and corresponding security tradeoffs 
in the Design chapter. A Java library is developed which exposes APIs (Application 
Programming Interfaces) for securely searching and indexing encrypted as well as plain text 
messages. The implemented library is then integrated with Columba, an open source Java email 
client and the secure search functionality is realised using the implemented library. 
This project proposes a design for securely searching encrypted email messages with Goh‟s 
Bloom filter technique at its core to index the email messages. A Java library is developed using 
Java Cryptographic library and Bouncy Castle Cryptographic library for indexing and searching 
OpenPGP encrypted messages, thus realising the primary objective of the project. 
The implemented library is extended to support S/MIME encrypted email messages to realise the 
secondary objectives.  The responsibility of differentiating whether the indexing process is a first 
time indexing of all old email messages or an incremental indexing of new messages is delegated 
to the invoker of the designed library by design. But as part of the realisation of the tertiary 
objective to integrate the library with an email client, the integration with the email client was 
seamless for both first time and incremental indexing. Thus the project realises both the primary 
and secondary objectives along with the first part of tertiary objectives. 
The secondary part of the tertiary objective to deploy a remote data server that synchronises with 
the local index data store is not demonstrated due to time constraints. This would involve 
utilising a data base replication and synchronisation technique which is typically used in 
applications where data resides on cloud storage. 
7.2 Development Strategy 
The selection of Goh‟s Bloom filter as a core technique for Secure Searcher satisfies the initial 
technique selection strategy. The implemented library asserts the feasibility of the 
implementation. The size of the created index is compact with each word being indexed uses 8 
bits and this could be further reduced depending on the false positive rate tolerance. Thus the 
selection satisfies the first two major strategies for technique selection. The security and 
performance of the technique is analysed as part of the respective sections in this chapter. 
This project strictly adhered with the initial development strategy of incremental development 
where a core implementation is extended to realise additional objectives. The implementation is 
extensible with the layered architecture asserting each layer is suitable for future extensions. 
Moreover, the integrated Columba email client follows plug-in architecture where the integrated 
search functionality can be extended further. 
The technique and the cryptographic libraries are selected after an initial prototype and an 
investigation in terms of search support for issues faced during prototyping. Mail dir is chosen as 
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a mail format for offline testing as it allows seamless addition and deletion of messages. 
Furthermore, all existing encrypted email messages can be exported as „.eml‟ (Electronic MaiL 
file) or Mail dir format and can be indexed and securely searched with the implemented library 
without any integration to the email client. This would need additional UI on top of the existing 
Mail dir server implementation. 
7.3 Testing Strategy 
JUnit tests are written to test the functional modules in each layer including the final exposed 
APIs. The effectiveness of the written tests is measured with EclEmma [Hoffmann et al. 2015] a 
code coverage analysis tool. The figure below shows that the tests written cover 86.7% of the 
implemented library. This is well above the adopted testing strategy to cover 80% of the source 
code. Apart from some exceptional cases, the code to handle S/MIME decryption for various 
mail message formats as part of mailreader affected the coverage. 
 
Figure 7-1 JUnit Test Coverage Report 
The suitability of the developed library for its use with a live email client is assessed with its 
integration to the Columba email client. Additional scenario testing performed as part of the 
evaluation of operations in the user manual complements the existing JUnit tests. Testing the 
capability of Bouncy Castle library to decrypt OpenPGP and S/MIME encrypted messages is out 
of the scope of this project. But the scenario testing used Mailvelope and Enigmail for sending 
OpenPGP encrypted messages whereas Microsoft Outlook email client is used to send S/MIME 
encrypted messages. Detailed list of tests summary is available as part of the appendix A Testing 
Summary. 
7.4 Functionality 
This section discusses the functionalities exposed as part of the implemented library and with the 
integration to the Columba email client. It concludes with a critical analysis of missing 
functionalities. 
7.4.1 Implementation Library 
This section evaluates the functionality or APIs exposed as part of the implementation library 
which includes both the indexing and searching functionalities. 
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7.4.1.1 Indexing 
Indexing APIs provide functionality to index both encrypted (OpenPGP and S/MIME) and plain 
text messages. In addition, an API to check whether the given message is already indexed is 
exposed. The APIs exposed accepts an Iterator [Oracle 2015a] of Java mail Message [Oracle 
2013a] instances allowing multiple email messages to be sent to the indexer. It is trivial for an 
email client to convert a message body to Java mail Message; the encrypted email generation 
functionality implemented as part of the secure email generator could also be used as a reference. 
As part of the integration with Columba, additional APIs that accepts a separate message id 
parameter was introduced. This is due to the fact that the Message Id header values as part of a 
Java mail Message needs to be of particular format within ankle brackets [Crocker 1982].  But, 
the email clients use a local message id typically starting with a number 1 for caching the 
messages locally and it is nontrivial to change the Message Id header of  an existing Java mail 
Message instance [StackOverflow 2013]. So the additional APIs enable seamless integration 
with email client. 
7.4.1.2 Searching 
For searching, the implementation exposes APIs to perform case insensitive search for a word in 
all the messages or in a particular message. Searcher configuration settings limit the number of 
search results returned by the searcher. The next batch search functionality where the searcher 
searches in the next batch after the previous search results assert the suitability in a typical email 
client search, where the results are displayed in batches of 20 in a page. 
Moreover, Searcher exposes APIs for a compound search where multiple words must be present 
in the message („AND „) or one of the words must be present in the message („OR‟).  These two 
APIs can be used to extend the search functionality to provide a more sophisticated search where 
some words may be present, other words must be present and other combinations. 
7.4.2 Integrated Email Client 
Email client integration shows both the indexing and search capability of the secure searcher. 
Moreover, the functionality exposed by Key Manager APIs for importing keys is also integrated 
to the client. A full key manager UI implementation to export or view the keys in the key store or 
import keys sent as part of the email is considered out of the scope of this project. 
7.4.3 Critical Functionality Analysis 
This section analyses the missing functionalities and discusses the feasibility of implementing 
such functionality and tradeoffs associated with them. 
7.4.3.1 Searching Subject or Attachments 
The Secure Searcher indexes only the message body of the email messages. It is trivial to 
integrate the functionality to search subject or attachments in the message with the addition of 
additional Bloom filter indices or adding to data to a single index. It is not implemented as the 
end-to-end email encryption tools do not encrypt the email message subject. This is due to the 
fact that the subject of the message is parsed by the spam detection services in the mail servers. 
Moreover, the email encryption tools do not support encryption of attachments and even a 
typical email client do not offer search support on attachments. Hence searching attachments 
(encrypted or plain) is considered out of scope of this project. 
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7.4.3.2 Context information 
Context sensitive search refers to searching for a word with respect to the context of another 
word i.e., a „SearchWord1„occurs before or after a „SearchWord2‟.  This functionality requires 
identifying the location of the searched word in the email message as its core.  
Implementing this would require adding the location information to the word before mapping it 
to the Bloom filter index. For example, instead of mapping a „word‟, „wordL‟ is mapped to the 
Bloom filter where L is the location in the message with N words [1-N]. But during the search 
process, the searcher has to search for all locations [1-N] in the message, making the search 
complexity polynomial O(N*M), where N is the average number of words in a message and M is 
the total number of messages indexed. 
Another way would be to store all the words in the message and compare against each word as in 
homomorphic encryption with the search capability. This would also require polynomial 
comparisons and it may not be possible with the investigated techniques that have linear search 
time as the implemented one. 
7.4.3.3 Number of occurrences 
This functionality refers to searching in terms of number of occurrences of search word i.e., the 
message contains „SearchWord‟ N times. The existing indexing process indexes the repeated 
occurrence information as per the proposed design modifications. During the search process, 
search queries on the indices of the search results needs to be implemented to sort based on 
repeated occurrence information. Implementing this functionality is considered as a future 
enhancement. 
7.4.3.4 Stemming 
The current implementation supports only exact word searching i.e., if the indexed word is 
„stemming‟, search for the word „stem‟ or „stems‟ or „stemmer‟ or „stemmed‟ would not return 
the index. The two possible approaches to implement this functionality are outlined below. 
During indexing, all the stemmed words could be indexed as well. In addition to increase in the 
indexing time, this would require increase in the Bloom filter index size or increase in the false 
positive rate. 
An alternative would be to index using the default approach and search for all the stemmed 
words. This would increase the search time depending on number of stemmed words. 
7.4.3.5 Technique Complexity 
Indexer needs to scan the email at least once to index it, while the current technique scans the 
input words twice for determining the total number of words in the message and then indexing 
the words. 
The technique used needs to process N records for searching N indexed messages demanding 
O(N) search complexity. The index record for each message needs to be stored separately to 
guarantee the security against frequency analysis attack described later in this chapter.  
If the security threat model do not require protection against frequency analysis attack then the 
search time could be made close to O(log N) using the current technique. As described as an 
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efficient search mechanism in Goh‟s Bloom filter technique [Goh 2004], for indexing each word, 
hash that word (trap door) but skip the next additional step where the hashed word is again used 
as the key to hash the message id. The trap door is then mapped to the Bloom filter index. Since 
the word mappings are no longer unique to each message, a Bloom filter tree could be created by 
computing bitwise OR of the two Bloom filter sets. Thus a non-existent word may be ruled out 
by searching against the root index in the Bloom filter tree. The cost of searching and indexing 
using the technique are analysed further in the Goh‟s report which are both in O(log N). 
Moreover, the  inverted index technique could even scale the complexity close to O(1). But this 
project considers frequency analysis attack as a basic security attack especially if the created 
index is stored on un-trusted storage. 
7.4.3.6 Lost Indexing Key 
As with any encryption requirements, the key used for indexing the encrypted email messages 
needs to be stored securely. Moreover, similar to the fact that the encrypted email messages 
could not be decrypted if the corresponding decryption key is lost, the created secure index is not 
usable if the corresponding indexing key is lost. 
7.4.3.7 False Positive Rate 
This project‟s default Bloom filter configuration employs 8 bits per word in the message body 
with 6 hash functions for mapping each word to the index. These parameters are described as 
ones that produce an optimal false positive probability of 0.0215 [Fan et al. 2000] asserting the 
selection as default parameters. Evaluating this theoretical false positive rate in the Secure 
Searcher implementation is considered out of scope of the project. 
It is possible to further reduce the false positive rate by increasing the number of bits per word 
configuration, requiring a space efficiency trade off. This is configurable with the help of 
configuration property settings in the implemented library. This project considers 0.0215 error 
rate as acceptable as this is non-critical search functionality. Moreover, the end user could view 
the email message and see that the word is not present in the email. 
7.4.3.8 Maximum word limit 
Maximum number of words that a message can contain so that it could be indexed by the current 
technique is represented below 
 
Maximum number of words = (java.lang.Integer.MAX_VALUE / BitsPerWord configuration) 
 
With the default configuration the above expression calculates to 26,84,35,456 maximum 
allowable words per message. Note that this is the supported maximum number of words by the 
implemented library, while the database Bloom filter index column would also need to be 
expanded to hold the large index. The default database configuration as part of the integration 
implementation supports a maximum limit of 32,768 words in a message. This project views this 
as an acceptable limit for the body of email messages used in typical communication. 
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7.5 Performance 
This section analyses the run time of secure searcher for indexing and searching test email 
messages generated using Encrypted email generator. The environment used for the analysis 
followed by indexing and searching time analyses is described in the following sections. 
7.5.1 Analysis Environment Setup 
Runtime analysis is carried on a Dell Inspiron 1525 Laptop with 2 GHz Intel Core 2 Duo T7250 
processor and 4GB Transcend DDR2 SDRAM. The indexing process is tested from an Eclipse 
Luna development environment installed on Windows 7 64 bit operating system.  
Initially this project considered using the spam or advertisement promotion email messages as 
the test source. But these email messages mostly contain images while this project requires a text 
based content for analysis. This project uses luindex [Blackburn et al. 2006] text data comprising 
1230 text documents utilised by DaCapo benchmark suite for benchmarking Apache Lucene 
[Apache Software Foundation 2012], an open source indexer and searcher for text documents. 
The text documents are converted to Open PGP, S/MIME and Plain messages using Encrypted 
email generator and the resulting 3690 email messages are used for analysing indexing and 
searching time. 
7.5.2 Indexing Analysis 
This analysis focuses on the following two analysis questions 
 What is the time taken to Index a message based on the number of words in a message? 
 How does the OpenPGP or S/MIME encryption affects the message indexing time? 
Plain, OpenPGP and S/MIME messages are indexed separately and the indexing process is 
repeated 5 times with the median value being plotted in the graphs below. The detailed values 
are included as part of the maildirtestresources/evaluationresults directory for further reference.  
The analysis graph shows the indexing time of approximately 1 second for indexing 3000 words 
and it increases with increase in the number of words with a maximum value of 5.5 seconds for 
indexing 32000 words in an OpenPGP encrypted message. Compared to plain messages, 
S/MIME and OpenPGP messages require additional time at the beginning for decryption process 
owing to key retrieval process. The following observations could be made from the 
corresponding analysis graph. 
 
Interestingly the indexing time for S/MIME and plain messages remain almost same while 
OpenPGP messages take comparatively more time. S/MIME decryption implementation uses 
predefined „SmimeKeyAlias‟ to identify the private key for decryption of S/MIME messages 
rendering the key lookup process negligible. OpenPGP decryption implementation scans the 
message payload to identify the encrypted public key id and requests the key store for respective 
OpenPGP private key. This project examined this additional scanning to be one of the causes for 
the slight increase in decryption time.  
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Figure 7-2 Messages Indexing Time vs Number of Messages 
 
The project‟s implementation could be modified to decrease the OpenPGP key look up process 
with a preconfigured key alias like „OpenPGPKeyAlias‟. But this project adheres to the default 
implementation as S/MIME keys are unique certificates issued by Certificate Authority to a 
person (email address). Hence an email address typically has one S/MIME key associated with it, 
whereas a user could have multiple PGP keys employed for different purposes and the current 
implementation supports storing multiple PGP keys per user. 
Another important observation is the initial time of up to 4 seconds for indexing only 100 words 
approximately.  This is the first email message considered for indexing during which the 
SecureSearcher initialises encryption services and pseudo key generator. This delay could be 
negated by performing the initialisation as part of a backend process after the client is loaded. 
Moreover, the indexing of email messages is typically handled by a backend process in the email 
client.  Hence this project does not analyse further to improve the complexity and performance of 
the indexing process. 
7.5.3 Searching Analysis 
This analysis focuses on the analysis question of measuring the search time against the number 
of index records to be processed. The results from five searches with different search words are 
used for the analysis.  
This analysis does not consider the length of the search word as any search word is hashed into 
256 bit hashed word (Trap door) for further searching. In addition, success or failure of the 
presence of a search word in the message accounts for a negligible processing time difference 
during search operation. This due to the fact that the additional processing involved is only on 
checking the additional indices in the Bloom filter for set bits. 
7.5.3.1 Search time with Message Id Encryption 
The graph presented next indicates the initial time of 8 seconds for searching 20 index records, 
which increases up to 30 seconds for searching 100 index records and requires around 6 minutes 
for searching 1260 index records. 
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Search time for the implementation is viewed unacceptable for practical purposes. On further 
investigation this project deduced that the decryption of message id during the search process of 
each index record took around 2 seconds. Note that the current implementation uses a single 
thread, with a single connection to database searching each record iteratively. Each step could be 
optimised to compensate for the performance loss during searching. 
 
Figure 7-3 Index Records Search time with Message Id Encryption 
7.5.3.1.1 Impact on Final Functionality 
This project modified the final functionality to use the plain message id, to better accommodate 
the integrated implementation with the Columba client.  The final index stored on the un-trusted 
storage is still secure as per the original Goh‟s Bloom filter technique. But the attacker model 
scope is modified, which is discussed in the next security evaluation section. More importantly, 
this project considers no information is leaked based on the plain message id information stored 
as part of the index. After the implementation of performance improvement changes, the 
encryption of message id could be turned on by changing flags in the SymmetricEncryptionUtil 
implementation.  
An alternative secure approach would be to store only the plain message id instead of encrypted 
message id. But instead of hashing the message id with trap door (initial word hashed with key) 
as the key, the message id could be hashed with the indexing key used for trap door. And then 
the hashed message id could be hashed with the trap door as the key before mapping the word to 
the Bloom filter. This guarantees the same attacker model as the initial design proposed by the 
project, by replacing decryption process during search process of record with a hashing process. 
This would be a good alternative and needs to be analysed further for the time taken to search 
with a less costly hashing process instead of decryption. 
7.5.3.2 Final Search time without Message Id Encryption 
This section analyses the modified final functionality without decryption or encryption of 
message id. As depicted in the analysis graph below, the search time is within 3.5 seconds for 
searching 3690 index records. The initial 2 second delay is due to the index key generation and 
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the trap door generation for the search word. This project considers the final delays as practical 
and acceptable as there is more scope for further performance improvements. 
 
Figure 7-4 Final Index Records Search Time vs Number of Index Records 
7.5.3.3 Search time against Bloom filter index size 
This analysis focuses on the analysis question to determine if the search time depends on the 
length of the index record being processed.  The initial spikes with maximum of 80 milliseconds 
are owing to the generation of pseudo key and the trap door word generation during each search. 
In summary, as depicted in the graph the search time increases with the length of the index 
record but the increase is negligible from 0 milliseconds to 4 milliseconds for lengths from 1000 
to 250000 Bloom filter size index record. 
 
Figure 7-5 Index Record Search Time vs Record Length 
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7.6 Security 
This section describes the threat model that the index stands against on un-trusted storage. Then 
it describes the enhanced attacker model with the proposed design alternative which needed 
further performance improvements. Finally the attacker model that this design does not 
withstand is described at the end. 
7.6.1 Security model of the Final implementation 
This section describes the attacker model that the final implementation protects against.  
7.6.1.1 IND-CKA Semantic Security 
The final implementation adheres to Goh‟s original secure index approach; hence it has IND-
CKA (INDistinguishability against Chosen Keyword Attack) semantic security. The security is 
explained with a challenger and indexer response scenario as follows.  
The challenger inputs the indexer with two identical length messages; the indexer returns two 
indices corresponding to the two messages as a response. The challenger would not be able to 
distinguish which index belongs to which message, no different than the probability of ½ (choice 
of picking one at random). Hence the index does not reveal the contents of the messages that are 
indexed. The implementation assumes no information is leaked from the message id information.  
7.6.1.2 Controlled Searching 
To perform search operation, a trap door of the search word needs to be created using the 
indexing key. Only the user with access to the indexing key could perform the search on the 
index.  
7.6.1.3 Frequency Analysis attack 
During the indexing process, hashing each unique message id again with the trap door word as 
the key renders the mapping unique to that index. I.e., if two messages have identical contents, 
then the resulting index would be different owing to the unique message id. 
Moreover, the number of words mapped on to the Bloom filter index depends on the number of 
words in the message. Even if the message with N words contains only 1 unique word repeated 
N times. After mapping the unique word, N-1 words with repeated information i.e., word2, 
word3... wordN-1 are mapped to Bloom filter index as per the proposed modification. 
7.6.1.4 Brute force Attack with Known Plain Text 
The trap door restricts an attacker from searching against the stored index i.e., only the user with 
access to the indexing key can generate the trap door. It does not prevent the attack against the 
original hashing technique used to generate the trap door. Because an attacker with a known 
plain message would be able to perform a brute force hashing of a known word and try different 
keys to search against the stored index. 
The HMAC [Krawczyk et al. 1997] function is strong against the known plain text attack, with 
the default configuration (HmacSHA256) requiring attacker to try 2
128
 key values. The 
recommended modification of encrypting the message id further strengthen the index against 
brute force attack as the attacker has to perform an additional brute force decryption of the 
message id on each index record.  
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7.6.2 Enhanced Security Model 
This section describes how the current implementation suffers from the mentioned vulnerabilities 
and how the proposed design modification withstands them. 
7.6.2.1 Replay Attack  
If the attacker gets hold of a trap door, then the attacker could use the same trap door to 
repeatedly perform search on the index. This would be a serious security flaw as it would divulge 
the presence of words in the new indexed messages as well. 
The additional encryption of message id by the proposed design modification strengthens the 
index against replay attack. The replay attack may not be possible as the attacker with the trap 
door word has to first decrypt the message id to search the index. But the cost of this secure 
modification is the time required to decrypt each message id during the search process.  
7.6.3 Vulnerability Model 
This section describes the threat model that both the final implementation and the enhanced 
security model could not withstand. 
7.6.3.1 Key store 
To begin with, the information regarding the length of the message indexed is leaked from the 
size of the index. Moreover, as with any security model, this model relies heavily on the secure 
storage of the indexing key. To reiterate, the default implementation provides an option to store 
keys in a password protected Java Key Store (JKS). 
7.6.3.2 In-Memory attack 
The design does not protect against an In-Memory attack where the attacker could view the In-
Memory data during indexing or searching process. As the indexing keys and decrypted 
messages are available In-Memory, they are vulnerable to attack. But even the end-to-end 
encryption tools suffer from this attack as the input password for the key needs to be loaded in 
the memory for authentication. The tools typically create a security sandbox model over the 
application process to prevent such attacks. Preventing this attack is considered out of scope of 
this project as per the adopted strategy. 
7.6.3.3 Confidentiality Integrity Availability (CIA) 
Furthermore, if the index is stored on un-trusted external system then the current design of secure 
index ensures only the confidentiality of the email messages. The un-trusted system should 
ensure the availability and integrity of the stored index. While there is no design modification to 
ensure the availability of the index, this project sees the following option to enforce integrity. 
Each Bloom filter index and message id data could be combined and a signature hashing 
algorithm could be used to add signature as another column. This would ensure authenticity and 
integrity of the data. As checking for integrity during each search operation would increase the 
search time, integrity check could be carried out on demand as a back ground task. 
7.7 Summary 
This project satisfies the initial objectives and conforms to the strategies adopted initially. The 
code coverage analysis asserts the effectiveness of the JUnit tests. Moreover, this project 
evaluated the performance of the implementation in terms of length of the messages indexed. 
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The existing implementation is modified to compensate for the performance loss during the 
search time evaluation. In addition, the integration of the implemented library with an open 
source email client asserts the suitability of using the library in a real environment. 
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8 Conclusions and Future Work 
This chapter provides a summary of achievements and the challenges faced during the course of 
the project. It concludes with a list of possible improvements and future works. 
8.1 Conclusions 
This project addresses the initial research question regarding the feasibility of securely searching 
encrypted email. Different secure search techniques and deployment architectures are discussed 
for its feasibility and security. This project recommends a deployment architecture having a 
cryptographically strong Goh‟s Bloom filter secure index technique at its core. 
The core objectives are realised with an implementation library supporting indexing and 
searching of plain, OpenPGP and S/MIME encrypted email messages. This project proposes 
modifications to Goh‟s secure index technique in a view to enhance the security and usability of 
the library.  The implemented modifications are selectively enabled depending on the assessment 
of performance in the previous chapter. Furthermore, this library is integrated with Columba, an 
open source Java email client to demonstrate the usability of the library in a live environment. 
This project adhered closely to the initial adopted strategies for design, development and 
evaluation. Finally the Evaluation chapter provides a critical analysis on the missing 
functionalities, performance and security. These analyses include the feasibility of incorporating 
additional functionalities to the existing library and tradeoffs associated with the same. 
Furthermore, the developed library adopted the layered architecture to support future extensions. 
Finally the search functionality in the integrated email client can be extended further owing to 
the plug-in architecture of the email client. 
8.2 Summary of Challenges 
This section summarises the challenges faced during the different phases of this project. 
Initial research phase involved the challenges in understanding the existing cryptographic secure 
search techniques.  The next challenge was in the design phase to identify a practical deployment 
architecture that enables the use of the adopted technique in a live environment.  
The development challenge involved adopting an extensible design and decrypting S/MIME 
encrypted messages where message.getContent() did not result in expected encrypted message 
body. Hence, this project adopted a work around to get raw message stream and parse it 
manually. For the integration with email client, the architecture and usability of the existing 
email clients including Pooka and Columba needed to be analysed for extensibility. For the 
Columba client with plug-in architecture, the main challenge was to identify source code work 
flow and the extension points for integration. 
Finally for evaluation, a sufficient source of encrypted messages needed to be identified. Initial 
choice of spam and promotion messages were rejected as they typically contain images and 
Dacapo benchmark source was finally selected. This text document source was then converted to 
encrypt email messages with the help of an encrypted email generator implementation. 
Moreover, this project moved from Mbox to Maildir format for offline email storage owing to 
the good support for adding or removing messages. 
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8.3 Future Works and Improvements 
In addition to the functionalities that were analysed critically for incorporation with the 
implementation in the previous chapter, this project views the following as possible future 
extensions. 
The current implementation searches index based on the indexed order. An extension could be to 
add functionality to search by ordered time or last accessed time or depending on the priority or 
the location folder of the message. Moreover, the number of occurrences of the searched word in 
a message could be used for sorting the search results as the repeated information is already 
indexed during the index operation. 
Furthermore, the current implementation indexes email messages belonging to one email account 
in one index store. But a typical user has multiple accounts for different purposes such as 
university, work place and personal. Since a user would typically use same end-to-end 
encryption key for all the accounts, indexing all these emails in a single repository store would 
be an interesting approach. 
Maildir client simulator could be further extended with a UI support enabling indexing and 
securely searching encrypted email messages offline. This would require exporting the email 
messages from email account in .eml or MailDir format and using the client simulator for 
searching the exported messages.  
This project‟s approach for secure searcher library was to add indexing capability at the back end 
server or thick client. An alternative would be an implementation as part of a thin client browser 
UI using Java script cryptographic APIs. This would be an interesting design allowing extensive 
usage with typical web email interfaces. 
The solution proposed in this project shows the feasibility of a secure search implementation for 
encrypted email messages. The adoption of the implemented library or the proposed design 
would enhance the usability of end-to-end encryption tools with the secure search functionality. 
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A Testing Summary 
JUnit tests were written for testing the functional modules written as part of the implementation 
library.  The tests are located inside the „tests‟ folder of the secure searcher project. The 
summary of tests written and their mapping to the source code are outlined as follows. 
 
Figure A-1 JUnit Test Execution Report 
A.1 Client Tests 
Tests written as part of „org.maynooth.client‟ package includes indexer, key store and searcher 
client tests testing the APIs exposed as part of the implementation library. 
Moreover, the package includes Bloom filter tests testing the Bloom filter index creation module 
and Decrypter tests testing the decrypter chain for testing the decrypter functionality for S/MIME 
and OpenPGP encrypted messages. 
A.2 Data store Tests 
Tests written as part of „org.maynooth.datastore‟ package include tests for DataIndexStorer and 
DataIndexSearcher that facilitate storing and retrieving the index. In addition, 
DataStoreConfigurationTests test the default data store configuration parameters. 
A.3 Encryption Utility Tests 
Tests written as part of „org.maynooth.encryptionUtil’ package include tests for default 
symmetric encryption utilities and HMAC hashing utilities implemented as part of the library. 
A.4 Server Tests 
Tests written as part of „org.maynooth.server’ package include tests for server side indexing and 
searching APIs. 
A.5 Performance Tests 
The performance tests were carried out with the help of MailDirReader implementation 
contained as part of „org.maynooth.mailreader.client‟ package in the „maildirtest’ source folder. 
The resources used by MailDirReader are contained in the „maildirtestresources‟ directory. The 
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folder names mentioned in the remainder of this section will refer „maildirtestresources’ as root 
directory. 
The „maildirectory/cur‟ is the source maildir folder looked up by the MailDirReader for current 
messages. The „messagecollection’ folder contains the OpenPGP, S/MIME and plain messages 
generated based on messages from Dacapo benchmark suite contained in „luindex‟ folder. These 
messages were moved to „cur‟ of the maildirectory to measure the performance. 
An alternative to MailDirReader is to use MailDirServer as part of 
„org.maynooth.mailreader.server’ package which could be used to demonstrate incremental 
indexing capability by adding new messages to „maildirectory/new‟ folder. 
The evaluation logs are part of „EvaluationResultLogs’ folder contain the logs obtained from 
each test runs. The final run values used to generate the charts are contained in 
FinalEvaluationReport.xlsx excel document. 
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B Changes to Original Specification 
The following changes were made to the original objectives after the initial submission of 
objectives as part of Thesis proposal. 
 The initial tertiary objective to integrate with existing end-to-end encryption tools was 
removed as it was not feasible due to time constraints. 
 As an alternative to the above tertiary objective, this project performed integration with a 
live client with a local index data store to demonstrate the functionalities. 
 The secondary part of the tertiary objective to deploy a remote data server that 
synchronises with the local index data store is removed due to time constraints. 
 In addition to the above tertiary objectives, Maildir server simulator was added for offline 
evaluation. This could be extended further to support offline indexing and searching of 
email messages. 
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C Project Plan 
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D User Manual 
This section contains the manual for configuring Columba email client with secure searcher 
functionality. Moreover, this section includes the details to configure demo account 
SecureSearch2015 for evaluation purpose. 
D.1    Columba Client Configuration 
The Secure Searcher with Columba client is available as an executable JAR 
(ColumbaSecureSearcher.jar) file under deployment directory. It could be run by double clicking 
the JAR or using the command line option „java –jar ColumbaSecureSearcher.jar‟. Both these 
options require a JRE (Java Run time Environment) for execution. This project was tested using 
JRE versions 7 and 8 and JRE version 8 is recommended for execution. 
For indexing and decrypting S/MIME messages unlimited strength JCEs (Java Cryptography 
Extensions) needs to be enabled by replacing some files in the default JRE used for execution. 
These files are available at Oracle sites [Oracle 2015c; Oracle 2015b]. The files local_policy.jar 
and US_export_policy.jar inside the <JREHome>\lib\security folder needs to be replaced with 
the corresponding downloaded files. 
For demo or evaluation purpose the user could directly jump to Section D.3. The indexing and 
searching functionalities are described as part of the Columba search functionality section. 
D.1.1 Email Account Configuration 
This section contains the details of a typical email client configuration for sending and receiving 
email messages. The steps followed for configuring the demo account are detailed as follows. 
On executing the Columba client for the first time, a new account configuration wizard pops up. 
Enter the account details as depicted in the figure below. 
 
Figure D-1 Columba New Account Wizard 
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Then enter incoming and outgoing server details for receiving email messages. In the setup the 
incoming server is an IMAP server account. 
 
Figure D-2 Columba Server Properties Wizard 
Go to Edit -> Mail Account Settings... Check the input configuration and configure the 
connection port for IMAP server details.  
 
Figure D-3 Columba Account Preferences Dialog 
The connection type and the port use for IMAP can be changed for the configured account. This 
depends on the connected IMAP server details. 
70 
 
 
Figure D-4 Columba IMAP Connection Settings 
D.1.2 Enable IMAP on Gmail 
If it is a Gmail account, connection to IMAP server for the account needs to be enabled as Gmail 
uses custom protocol for the connection. This needs to be turned on by following Settings -> 
Enable IMAP on the Gmail account logged in through a browser. 
 
Figure D-5 Gmail Enable IMAP 
Moreover, Gmail considers connections through IMAP server as less secure and therefore less 
secure connection has to be turned on. This is needed for the connection from Columba to Gmail 
account and is irrespective of whether Columba has an integrated secure searcher.  
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Figure D-6 Gmail Less Secure Access 
D.2    Secure Searcher Configuration 
During the first time Columba initialisation, a default key store and HSQL index data store is 
created in the Columba home directory „<Home>/.columba‟ under the subdirectory 
„securesearcher’. For example, ‘C:\Users\<User>\.columba\securesearcher’ is the directory in 
the Windows environment. All default configurations such as index configuration, key store and 
index data store can be changed in that directory. 
D.2.1 Key store Configuration 
Before starting the indexing process, the PGP and S/MIME keys should be imported to the key 
store for decryption and indexing. 
 
Figure D-7 Columba KeyStore Configuration 
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As depicted in the figure, go to ‘Utilities -> KeyStore Configuration Settings...’ Key Store 
Configuration dialog allows the user to import one S/MIME private key (.pfx file) and multiple 
PGP private keys (ASCII format). While importing the key, the user needs to input the password 
with which the source private key is protected. After the import, all keys would be stored using a 
single master password of that of the stored key store. 
 
Figure D-8 Enter Import Key and Secure Search Password Dialogs 
The default key store password is „Welcome‟. This should be entered as a master password for 
secure searcher. Moreover, the key store used for secure search can be changed using key store 
configuration dialog. 
D.2.2 Indexing 
Go to ‘Utilities -> Index All Encrypted Messages’ to select the Inbox folder on which full index 
should be run initially. This would clear the index store and create a secure index of all the 
encrypted messages in that folder. 
Columba integration has online indexing feature where any new email messages are 
automatically indexed and deletion of any messages would result in removal of the 
corresponding index from the index store. 
 
Figure D-9 Columba Index All Encrypted Messages Dialog 
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D.2.3 Searching 
Select the Search type to ‘Encrypted Body Contains’, enter the search word and press enter to 
search indexed email messages. 
 
Figure D-10 Columba Encrypted Message Search 
D.3    Demo Account Configuration 
To configure the demo account, the demo account home directory (columbademo1 or 
columbademo2) in the Deployment\DemoConfiguration\DemoAccounts directory needs to be 
extracted to .columba directory at User home „‘C:\Users\<User>\.columba’.  
The KeyStoreFile and DatabaseURL location configuration settings in the indexer configuration 
file at C:\Users\<User>\.columba\securesearcher\indexConfiguration.xml need to be corrected. 
Change the <User> („Dell‟ in demo configuration) to the installed machine user directory. 
 KeyStoreFile="C:\Users\<User>\.columba\securesearcher\keystore\IndexerKeystore.jks" 
 <DatabaseURL 
DatabaseURL="jdbc:hsqldb:file:C:\Users\<User>\.columba\securesearcher\database\Inde
xStore;user=test;password=test"> 
Moreover, the PGP and S/MIME keys used for the demo account are available as part of the 
deployment directory. Use the default key store password „Welcome‟ as the master secure search 
password. 
D.3.1 Demo Account Configuration Details  
D.3.1.1 Demo1 Account Details 
Username: SecureSearch2015@gmail.com 
Password: secure2015 
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Demo Key store password: Welcome 
D.3.1.1 Demo2 Account Details 
Username: SecureSearch20151@gmail.com 
Password: secure2015 
Demo Key store password: Welcome 
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